| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown
fsnotify_destroy_marks() keeps a reference to its current mark while it
drops conn->lock to destroy the mark. This stabilizes the forward-walk
cursor, but does not prevent a new mark from being inserted before it.
For example, an inotify watch re-added after IN_IGNORED sorts before the
old, detached mark for the same group. The walk can miss the replacement
and then detach the entire connector from the object.
The replacement is still on its group's marks_list and, for inotify, in
the watch IDR. The group mutex no longer protects the connector's object
from disappearing. An unprivileged fdinfo read racing the final detach
can consequently call igrab(NULL):
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in igrab+0x24/0x100
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000148
Call Trace:
igrab+0x24/0x100
inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1dc/0x5e0
seq_show+0x397/0x690
Set a DESTROYING flag under conn->lock before starting the walk, and
reject new marks on that connector with -ENOENT. The existing add-mark
error paths undo the temporary group-list entry and the backend's watch
allocation. Do not wait for teardown while holding the group mutex,
which the destroyer needs. Once the old connector is detached, an add
can install a fresh connector as before.
This closes the insertion race for all object types using the common
connector teardown, without changing the mark reference or SRCU lifetime
rules. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libsas: Fix SMP IO deadlock during HA resume
smp_execute_task_sg() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() on the host before
issuing an SMP command. When that command is itself issued from the HA
resume path, the get_sync() deadlocks: it waits for the ongoing resume
(the device is RPM_RESUMING), while the resume is blocked in
sas_drain_work() waiting for that same SMP IO to complete.
The deadlock needs an expander-attached SATA disk. During
sas_resume_ha() -> sas_drain_work(), DISCE_RESUME -> sas_resume_sata()
-> ata_sas_port_resume() requests ATA_EH_RESET, and the hard reset for
such a disk is done via SMP PHY CONTROL (sas_ata_hard_reset() ->
sas_phy_reset() -> sas_smp_phy_control() ->
smp_execute_task_sg()). Direct-attached SATA resets through
lldd_control_phy() and SSP devices use TMFs, so neither hits this.
Replace the get_sync()/put_sync() pair with
pm_runtime_get_noresume()/pm_runtime_put(). smp_execute_task_sg() only
needs to hold off autosuspend while the SMP is in flight, and it must
not try to resume the host: a sync resume issued from the HA resume path
itself is what deadlocks, and by the time sas_resume_ha() runs, hw_init
has already reinitialized the hardware, so the device is accessible
without one.
The usage reference is still required. Discovery work normally runs
inside an event worker's PM reference, taken at sas_notify_port_event()
notify time and held until the handler has flushed the disco
queue. sas_rediscover_ex_phy() however requeues DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN
from within the revalidation worker itself, and flush_workqueue() does
not wait for work items queued during execution, so that chained
revalidation runs with no outer PM reference - without the
get_noresume(), its SMP could race autosuspend.
For the BSG path, sas_smp_handler() is the only caller which may find
the host autosuspended: expander SMP requests do not go through any SCSI
device request queue, so nothing else in that path holds the host
awake. Resume it there with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and check the
result. |
| HCL BigFix AEX is affected by an Information Disclosure vulnerability due to improper handling of errors or exceptional conditions. This could allow an attacker to obtain sensitive technical information, including stack traces, system details, or internal paths, potentially facilitating further attacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gud: validate GUD_ROTATION_0 is present in supported rotations
The rotation argument to drm_plane_create_rotation_property() is set to
DRM_MODE_ROTATE_0, and the device reported rotation bitmask is used as
the supported_rotations argument. The driver never validates that
GUD_ROTATION_0 is present, so a device that omits it from its
GUD_PROPERTY_ROTATION triggers the
WARN_ON(rotation & ~supported_rotations) in
drm_plane_create_rotation_property()
Fix this by skipping the creation of rotation property if the device
doesn't have the GUD_ROTATION_0 bit |
| PHP has various global state that temporarily points into request memory. In some scenarios, global state may not be correctly reset, or may be repopulated after being reset. The global state may then refer to request memory even after it has been freed. Subsequent requests may read or branch on this stale state before it is fully initialized. Multiple strategies can trigger this condition and produce remote code execution (RCE). |
| PHP uses longjmp() for out-of-memory (OOM) errors to exit the current context and abort handling of the request. Some contexts may not properly account for this scenario and leave request memory in an uninitialized state before performing an allocation. The subsequent request cleanup procedure may read or branch on this memory. Multiple OOM strategies can consistently trigger this condition and lead to remote code execution (RCE). |
| A path handling issue was addressed with improved logic. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. A malicious Screen Sharing peer may be able to create arbitrary symlinks as root. |
| The auth0/java-jwt library may terminate a thread if it receives a JWT with a timestamp claim (exp, nbf, iat) containing an out-of-range value. The condition occurs during token parsing, prior to signature verification. Repeated requests of this nature may lead to degraded availability of the affected service. |
| Wasmtime 46.0.0 before 48.0.4 and 49.0.0 before 49.0.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the wasmtime-wasi WASIp3 implementation that allows guests to abort the Unix host process. Guests with mutable preopened directory access can call set-times or set-times-at with negative seconds timestamps before the epoch, triggering an assertion failure that crashes the host. |
| Routinator exits when an rsync URI for a file obtained over RRDP contains a path that cannot be stored on disk, such as too long file names, and folder names that overlap with existing file names. |
| Routinator runs out of open connections on the HTTP server when many connections are opened but never closed, leaving the HTTP server unavailable. This condition can be triggered maliciously by an attacker by opening a large number of connections to the HTTP server.
This only affects users that make their HTTP or RTR server available to untrusted networks. |
| Motor.NET before 0.19.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows a remote attacker who can publish to a consumed queue to crash the service permanently by sending a message with crafted cloudEvents headers. Attackers can supply an invalid cloudEvents:motorversion, a single double-quote header value, or an unparsable typed attribute such as cloudEvents:time to trigger an unhandled exception in ExtractCloudEvent that is treated as fatal, causing the application to stop and the unacknowledged message to be redelivered on restart, resulting in a permanent crash-loop. |
| Motor.NET before 0.19.0 contains a denial-of-service vulnerability that allows a remote attacker who can produce records to a consumed topic to crash the service permanently by sending a single crafted record. By setting the content-type header to application/cloudevents+json and omitting required CloudEvent attributes (id, source, type), the attacker triggers an ArgumentException in KafkaMessageConsumer.SingleMessageHandlingAsync that is treated as fatal, causing the host to stop and re-process the same poison record on every restart, resulting in a permanent crash-loop. |
| Motor.NET before 0.19.0 contains an uncaught exception vulnerability in JsonNetDeserializer.Deserialize that allows a remote attacker who can publish to a consumed queue or topic to crash the service permanently by sending structurally valid JSON that does not match the handler's expected type. Attackers can exploit the fact that JsonSerializationException is not caught alongside JsonReaderException and InvalidCastException, causing TypedConsumerService.SingleMessageConsumeAsync to treat the error as CriticalFailure and call StopApplication, which combined with the unacknowledged message being redelivered on restart results in a permanent crash-loop. |
| Routinator runs out of memory when the JSON output is requested many times concurrently. This condition can be triggered maliciously by an attacker by opening a large number of connections to the HTTP server. Additionally Routinator runs into a stack overflow and exits when a payload item with too much metadata is discarded at once.
This only affects users that make their HTTP or RTR server available to untrusted networks. |
| When Routinator encounters an RRDP notification file with gaps in the delta entries, it is still accepted and parsed, potentially leading to missing data. If it encounters too many delta entries it may run out of memory. |
| When Routinator encounters a CRL with many entries, it may hang or run out of memory. If Routinator encounters a CRL file with the wrong encoding, it may exit. |
| Routinator stores a newly-retrieved TA certificate via HTTPS in cache without validation, potentially overwriting a known good TA certificate even if validation fails. |
| When parsing an AS range in Routinator, if the maximum value of the range is smaller than the minimum value of the range, Routinator will never reach the maximum value and run out of memory. |
| Mattermost versions <=11.9 11.1.9 11.5.8 11.10.7.0 fail to validate Zoom chat line length before slicing which allows an authenticated attacker to crash the Agents plugin via summarizing a Zoom chat transcription containing short continuation lines. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00723 |
