| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch
(141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
NETEM.
The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether
it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
incremented by init_vf [3].
By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].
However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."
To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.
[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: Prevent creation of classes with TC_H_ROOT
The function qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() uses TC_H_ROOT as a termination
condition when traversing up the qdisc tree to update parent backlog
counters. However, if a class is created with classid TC_H_ROOT, the
traversal terminates prematurely at this class instead of reaching the
actual root qdisc, causing parent statistics to be incorrectly maintained.
In case of DRR, this could lead to a crash as reported by Mingi Cho.
Prevent the creation of any Qdisc class with classid TC_H_ROOT
(0xFFFFFFFF) across all qdisc types, as suggested by Jamal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubi: ubi_wl_put_peb: Fix infinite loop when wear-leveling work failed
Following process will trigger an infinite loop in ubi_wl_put_peb():
ubifs_bgt ubi_bgt
ubifs_leb_unmap
ubi_leb_unmap
ubi_eba_unmap_leb
ubi_wl_put_peb wear_leveling_worker
e1 = rb_entry(rb_first(&ubi->used)
e2 = get_peb_for_wl(ubi)
ubi_io_read_vid_hdr // return err (flash fault)
out_error:
ubi->move_from = ubi->move_to = NULL
wl_entry_destroy(ubi, e1)
ubi->lookuptbl[e->pnum] = NULL
retry:
e = ubi->lookuptbl[pnum]; // return NULL
if (e == ubi->move_from) { // NULL == NULL gets true
goto retry; // infinite loop !!!
$ top
PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM COMMAND
7676 root 20 0 0 0 0 R 100.0 0.0 ubifs_bgt0_0
Fix it by:
1) Letting ubi_wl_put_peb() returns directly if wearl leveling entry has
been removed from 'ubi->lookuptbl'.
2) Using 'ubi->wl_lock' protecting wl entry deletion to preventing an
use-after-free problem for wl entry in ubi_wl_put_peb().
Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/uverbs: Fix mmap_lock/disassociation_lock circular dependency
Commit 51976c6cd786 ("RDMA/core: Provide rdma_user_mmap_disassociate()
to disassociate mmap pages") introduced disassociation_lock to protect
new mmap registrations against uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate(), but
created an ABBA deadlock:
Thread A (mmap / fork):
mmap_lock -> disassociation_lock
Thread B (disassociate):
disassociation_lock -> mmap_lock
Fix by removing disassociation_lock entirely and using the pre-existing
hw_destroy_rwsem instead. hw_destroy_rwsem already provides the same
protection: rdma_umap_open() and ib_uverbs_mmap() both use
down_read_trylock() before registering a new VMA, so holding hw_destroy_rwsem
in uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate() is sufficient to block new registrations.
trylock is used in both mmap paths (not blocking down_read) because
mmap_lock is already held on entry, and uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate()
acquires mmap_lock internally — a blocking read would recreate the same
deadlock.
The only caller that was not taking hw_destroy_rwsem for write was
rdma_user_mmap_disassociate(). Fix it to take the rwsem per-ufile while
iterating under lists_mutex. This is safe because ib_uverbs_close()
releases hw_destroy_rwsem entirely before acquiring lists_mutex, so the
two locks are never held simultaneously.
lockdep warning:
[ 776.654252] ======================================================
[ 776.655214] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 776.656167] 6.18.0for-upstream_debug_94e244d9ccab #1 Not tainted
[ 776.657114] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 776.658087] devlink/14824 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 776.658879] ffff88811170c800 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x168/0x780 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.660479]
[ 776.660479] but task is already holding lock:
[ 776.661460] ffff888142d92b08 (&file->disassociation_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x39/0x780 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.663177]
[ 776.663177] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 776.663177]
[ 776.664525]
[ 776.664525] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 776.665724]
[ 776.665724] -> #2 (&file->disassociation_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 776.666887] __mutex_lock+0x16d/0x2330
[ 776.667633] rdma_umap_open+0x129/0x280 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.668489] dup_mmap+0xa40/0x1790
[ 776.669170] copy_process+0x5dd2/0x6170
[ 776.669933] kernel_clone+0xb6/0x610
[ 776.670636] __do_sys_clone+0xb5/0xf0
[ 776.671354] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x12e0
[ 776.672083] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 776.672940]
[ 776.672940] -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 776.673985] down_write_nested+0x90/0x1e0
[ 776.674751] dup_mmap+0x201/0x1790
[ 776.675448] copy_process+0x5dd2/0x6170
[ 776.676180] kernel_clone+0xb6/0x610
[ 776.676904] __do_sys_clone+0xb5/0xf0
[ 776.677615] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x12e0
[ 776.678351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 776.679239]
[ 776.679239] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[ 776.680253] __lock_acquire+0x18c6/0x2ec0
[ 776.681018] lock_acquire+0x10e/0x2e0
[ 776.681742] down_read+0x95/0x430
[ 776.682395] uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate+0x168/0x780 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.683436] uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x1ae/0x270 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.684416] ib_uverbs_remove_one+0x22b/0x420 [ib_uverbs]
[ 776.685371] remove_client_context+0xa6/0xf0 [ib_core]
[ 776.686342] disable_device+0x12b/0x240 [ib_core]
[ 776.687249] __ib_unregister_device+0x269/0x460 [ib_core]
[ 776.688233] ib_unregister_device+0x21/0x30 [ib_core]
[ 776.689140] mlx5r_remove+0xd0/0x170 [mlx5_ib]
[ 776.689999] device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x5
---truncated--- |
| An issue was discovered in cp-demangle.c in GNU libiberty, as distributed in GNU Binutils 2.31. There is a stack consumption vulnerability resulting from infinite recursion in the functions d_name(), d_encoding(), and d_local_name() in cp-demangle.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial-of-service via an ELF file, as demonstrated by nm. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on
When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc.
If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated
again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted.
The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around
the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is
per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths
and is not safe without additional locking.
Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch:
- increment it on the duplicate before re-enqueue
- skip duplication for any skb whose tc_depth is already non-zero.
This marks the packet itself rather than mutating qdisc state,
therefore it is safe regardless of tree topology or concurrency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure
When ttm_tt_swapout() fails, the current code calls
ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() followed by ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()
to restore the resource's bulk_move membership.
However, ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() places the resource at the tail
of the LRU list which, relative to the walk cursor's hitch node (placed
immediately after the resource when it was yielded), puts the resource
*in front of the* the hitch. The next list_for_each_entry_continue() from
the hitch finds the same resource again, causing an infinite loop.
Fix by deferring del_bulk_move to the success path only.
On the success path, TTM_TT_FLAG_SWAPPED has just been set by
ttm_tt_swapout() but the resource is still tracked in the bulk_move range,
so ttm_resource_del_bulk_move()'s !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard would
incorrectly skip the removal. Introduce
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() which bypasses that guard. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure
Apply the same fix as b2ed01e7ad ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout()
infinite LRU walk on swapout failure") to the ttm_bo_shrink() path.
Move del_bulk_move from before the backup to after success only,
using ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() since the resource
is now unevictable once fully backed up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests
The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the
BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are
done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time.
In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the
hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver
needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn
bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between
flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck.
This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad
BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop
saying it has data.
This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug
per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: vport: fix self-deadlock on release of tunnel ports
vports are used concurrently and protected by RCU, so netdev_put()
must happen after the RCU grace period. So, either in an RCU call or
after the synchronize_net(). The rtnl_delete_link() must happen under
RTNL and so can't be executed in RCU context. Calling synchronize_net()
while holding RTNL is not a good idea for performance and system
stability under load in general, so calling netdev_put() in RCU call
is the right solution here.
However,
when the device is deleted, rtnl_unlock() will call netdev_run_todo()
and block until all the references are gone. In the current code this
means that we never reach the call_rcu() and the vport is never freed
and the reference is never released, causing a self-deadlock on device
removal.
Fix that by moving the rcu_call() before the rtnl_unlock(), so the
scheduled RCU callback will be executed when synchronize_net() is
called from the rtnl_unlock()->netdev_run_todo() while the RTNL itself
is already released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid potential endless loop in convert_chmap_v3()
The convert_chmap_v3() has a loop with its increment size of
cs_desc->wLength, but we forgot to validate cs_desc->wLength itself,
which may lead to potential endless loop by a malformed descriptor.
Add a proper size check to abort the loop for plugging the hole. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()
When retry_aligned_read() encounters an overlapped stripe, it releases
the stripe via raid5_release_stripe() which puts it on the lockless
released_stripes llist. In the next raid5d loop iteration,
release_stripe_list() drains the stripe onto handle_list (since
STRIPE_HANDLE is set by the original IO), but retry_aligned_read()
runs before handle_active_stripes() and removes the stripe from
handle_list via find_get_stripe() -> list_del_init(). This prevents
handle_stripe() from ever processing the stripe to resolve the
overlap, causing an infinite loop and soft lockup.
Fix this by using __release_stripe() with temp_inactive_list instead
of raid5_release_stripe() in the failure path, so the stripe does not
go through the released_stripes llist. This allows raid5d to break out
of its loop, and the overlap will be resolved when the stripe is
eventually processed by handle_stripe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion
Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu()
rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading
/proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's
been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix
this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that
are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means
there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list
here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from
the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: aqc111: Do not perform PM inside suspend callback
syzbot reports "task hung in rpm_resume"
This is caused by aqc111_suspend calling
the PM variant of its write_cmd routine.
The simplified call trace looks like this:
rpm_suspend()
usb_suspend_both() - here udev->dev.power.runtime_status == RPM_SUSPENDING
aqc111_suspend() - called for the usb device interface
aqc111_write32_cmd()
usb_autopm_get_interface()
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
rpm_resume() - here we call rpm_resume() on our parent
rpm_resume() - Here we wait for a status change that will never happen.
At this point we block another task which holds
rtnl_lock and locks up the whole networking stack.
Fix this by replacing the write_cmd calls with their _nopm variants |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: register phy led_triggers during probe to avoid AB-BA deadlock
There is an AB-BA deadlock when both LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV and
LED_TRIGGER_PHY are enabled:
[ 1362.049207] [<8054e4b8>] led_trigger_register+0x5c/0x1fc <-- Trying to get lock "triggers_list_lock" via down_write(&triggers_list_lock);
[ 1362.054536] [<80662830>] phy_led_triggers_register+0xd0/0x234
[ 1362.060329] [<8065e200>] phy_attach_direct+0x33c/0x40c
[ 1362.065489] [<80651fc4>] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0x15c/0x23c
[ 1362.071480] [<8066ee18>] mtk_open+0x7c/0xba0
[ 1362.075849] [<806d714c>] __dev_open+0x280/0x2b0
[ 1362.080384] [<806d7668>] __dev_change_flags+0x244/0x24c
[ 1362.085598] [<806d7698>] dev_change_flags+0x28/0x78
[ 1362.090528] [<807150e4>] dev_ioctl+0x4c0/0x654 <-- Hold lock "rtnl_mutex" by calling rtnl_lock();
[ 1362.094985] [<80694360>] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x4e0
[ 1362.099567] [<802e9c4c>] sys_ioctl+0x32c/0xd8c
[ 1362.104022] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58
Here LED_TRIGGER_PHY is registering LED triggers during phy_attach
while holding RTNL and then taking triggers_list_lock.
[ 1362.191101] [<806c2640>] register_netdevice_notifier+0x60/0x168 <-- Trying to get lock "rtnl_mutex" via rtnl_lock();
[ 1362.197073] [<805504ac>] netdev_trig_activate+0x194/0x1e4
[ 1362.202490] [<8054e28c>] led_trigger_set+0x1d4/0x360 <-- Hold lock "triggers_list_lock" by down_read(&triggers_list_lock);
[ 1362.207511] [<8054eb38>] led_trigger_write+0xd8/0x14c
[ 1362.212566] [<80381d98>] sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xbc
[ 1362.217688] [<8037fcd8>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17c/0x28c
[ 1362.223174] [<802cbd70>] vfs_write+0x21c/0x3c4
[ 1362.227712] [<802cc0c4>] ksys_write+0x78/0x12c
[ 1362.232164] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58
Here LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV is being enabled on an LED. It first takes
triggers_list_lock and then RTNL. A classical AB-BA deadlock.
phy_led_triggers_registers() does not require the RTNL, it does not
make any calls into the network stack which require protection. There
is also no requirement the PHY has been attached to a MAC, the
triggers only make use of phydev state. This allows the call to
phy_led_triggers_registers() to be placed elsewhere. PHY probe() and
release() don't hold RTNL, so solving the AB-BA deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: mcp251x: fix deadlock in error path of mcp251x_open
The mcp251x_open() function call free_irq() in its error path with the
mpc_lock mutex held. But if an interrupt already occurred the
interrupt handler will be waiting for the mpc_lock and free_irq() will
deadlock waiting for the handler to finish.
This issue is similar to the one fixed in commit 7dd9c26bd6cf ("can:
mcp251x: fix deadlock if an interrupt occurs during mcp251x_open") but
for the error path.
To solve this issue move the call to free_irq() after the lock is
released. Setting `priv->force_quit = 1` beforehand ensure that the IRQ
handler will exit right away once it acquired the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop triggered by zero-sized ATTR_LIST
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an ATTR_LIST attribute
indicates a zero data size while the driver allocates memory for it.
When ntfs_load_attr_list() processes a resident ATTR_LIST with data_size set
to zero, it still allocates memory because of al_aligned(0). This creates an
inconsistent state where ni->attr_list.size is zero, but ni->attr_list.le is
non-null. This causes ni_enum_attr_ex to incorrectly assume that no attribute
list exists and enumerates only the primary MFT record. When it finds
ATTR_LIST, the code reloads it and restarts the enumeration, repeating
indefinitely. The mount operation never completes, hanging the kernel thread.
This patch adds validation to ensure that data_size is non-zero before memory
allocation. When a zero-sized ATTR_LIST is detected, the function returns
-EINVAL, preventing a DoS vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: ntfs3: check return value of indx_find to avoid infinite loop
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed dentry in the ntfs3 filesystem can cause the kernel to hang
during the lookup operations. By setting the HAS_SUB_NODE flag in an
INDEX_ENTRY within a directory's INDEX_ALLOCATION block and manipulating the
VCN pointer, an attacker can cause the indx_find() function to repeatedly
read the same block, allocating 4 KB of memory each time. The kernel lacks
VCN loop detection and depth limits, causing memory exhaustion and an OOM
crash.
This patch adds a return value check for fnd_push() to prevent a memory
exhaustion vulnerability caused by infinite loops. When the index exceeds the
size of the fnd->nodes array, fnd_push() returns -EINVAL. The indx_find()
function checks this return value and stops processing, preventing further
memory allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop in attr_load_runs_range on inconsistent metadata
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an attribute header
indicates an empty run list, while directory entries reference it as
containing actual data. In NTFS, setting evcn=-1 with svcn=0 is a valid way
to represent an empty run list, and run_unpack() correctly handles this by
checking if evcn + 1 equals svcn and returning early without parsing any run
data. However, this creates a problem when there is metadata inconsistency,
where the attribute header claims to be empty (evcn=-1) but the caller
expects to read actual data. When run_unpack() immediately returns success
upon seeing this condition, it leaves the runs_tree uninitialized with
run->runs as a NULL. The calling function attr_load_runs_range() assumes
that a successful return means that the runs were loaded and sets clen to 0,
expecting the next run_lookup_entry() call to succeed. Because runs_tree
remains uninitialized, run_lookup_entry() continues to fail, and the loop
increments vcn by zero (vcn += 0), leading to an infinite loop.
This patch adds a retry counter to detect when run_lookup_entry() fails
consecutively after attr_load_runs_vcn(). If the run is still not found on
the second attempt, it indicates corrupted metadata and returns -EINVAL,
preventing the Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: avoid infinite retry looping in netlink_unicast()
netlink_attachskb() checks for the socket's read memory allocation
constraints. Firstly, it has:
rmem < READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
to check if the just increased rmem value fits into the socket's receive
buffer. If not, it proceeds and tries to wait for the memory under:
rmem + skb->truesize > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)
The checks don't cover the case when skb->truesize + sk->sk_rmem_alloc is
equal to sk->sk_rcvbuf. Thus the function neither successfully accepts
these conditions, nor manages to reschedule the task - and is called in
retry loop for indefinite time which is caught as:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 0-....: (25999 ticks this GP) idle=ef2/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=262269/262269 fqs=6212
(t=26000 jiffies g=230833 q=259957)
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 5.10.240 #68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:120
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold lib/nmi_backtrace.c:105
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:335
rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold kernel/rcu/tree.c:2590
update_process_times kernel/time/timer.c:1953
tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227
tick_sched_timer kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1399
__hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1652
hrtimer_interrupt kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1717
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1113
asm_call_irq_on_stack arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:808
</IRQ>
netlink_attachskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1234
netlink_unicast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1349
kauditd_send_queue kernel/audit.c:776
kauditd_thread kernel/audit.c:897
kthread kernel/kthread.c:328
ret_from_fork arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Restore the original behavior of the check which commit in Fixes
accidentally missed when restructuring the code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). |
