| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mounting an attacker-controlled FAT image with fault tolerance enabled causes an out-of-bounds heap write during log replay. The write is attacker-positioned and attacker-valued, and on a common embedded memory layout it reaches the FX_MEDIA driver callback, giving control of the instruction pointer. |
| The Cortex-A7 MMU Modules port validates a caller-supplied buffer by translating **one address** — the first byte. The common Module Manager hands its range check the module instance, the start address and the complete byte size; the Cortex-A7 implementation discarded the instance and the size and asked the MMU a single question about the start.
A memory-protected module therefore passed any range whose first byte was user-readable, however far the rest of it reached. Privileged dispatch code then read or wrote the whole range. Because every protected-module dispatcher that consumes a buffer or an extra-parameter array goes through this one macro, the defect is not in any individual service: it is in the primitive all of them rely on. |
| A ThreadX module chooses `object_size` when it calls `txm_module_object_allocate`. The Module Manager adds its own 16-byte private header to that size and asked the object pool for the result **without checking the addition**. A size near the top of a `ULONG` wrapped, the pool served a block far smaller than the header, and the manager then wrote the header past the end of it and into the neighbouring byte-pool block. |
| The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c validated its two output parameters, buff and buff_len, with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() rather than K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(). Both are pure out-parameters: z_impl_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() stores the mempool buffer address and its length through them. The distinction is enforced by every architecture validator — arch_buffer_validate() on RISC-V PMP explicitly accepts the global __rom_region/__rodata_region for reads only, and the ARM MPU validators accept P_RO_U_RO and P_RW_U_RO regions for reads only — so a read-validated pointer is not necessarily writable by the calling thread.
An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to an RTIO context (rtio_access_grant()) can invoke the rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() syscall with buff/buff_len pointing at memory it may read but not write, and with a completion-queue entry whose flags field it fully controls (only RTIO_CQE_FLAG_MEMPOOL_BUFFER in flags[7:0] is required; flags[19:8] and flags[31:20] supply the block index and count). The kernel then performs a pointer-sized and a 4-byte store through those addresses while running in supervisor mode. Reaching the store requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_RTIO_SYS_MEM_BLOCKS, the configuration behind RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL; without the latter the implementation returns -ENOTSUP and writes nothing.
Two outcomes follow. If the target lies in a memory-domain partition declared K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RO (privileged read-write, user read-only), the kernel-mode store succeeds and deposits partly attacker-chosen values into memory the memory domain had marked read-only for that thread, bypassing the partition's write protection. If the target lies in globally readable but unwritable memory such as .text/.rodata in flash, the store faults in kernel mode; the fault is delivered to z_fatal_error() and the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() halts or reboots the device, giving an unprivileged thread a reliable full denial of service.
The read-permission check does bound the damage: the address must still be readable by the calling thread, so kernel-private memory cannot be targeted and no confidential data is disclosed. The fix replaces both checks with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(), so a thread lacking write permission is terminated by K_OOPS before the implementation runs; the cqe argument correctly remains read-validated. |
| The X.509 parser in NetX Secure accepts an RSA public key of any size, but every signature-verification path decrypts into fixed-size buffers dimensioned for the `NX_CRYPTO_MAX_RSA_MODULUS_SIZE` default of 4096 bits. A certificate carrying a larger modulus drives an out-of-bounds write past a file-scope static during ordinary certificate-chain verification.
It is reachable pre-authentication. The issuer used for the crypto operation is looked up in the remote, peer-supplied store before the trusted store, so the attacker supplies the oversized key themselves as an intermediate in the chain they present. It triggers on a TLS or DTLS client verifying a malicious server's chain, and on a server performing client-certificate authentication. |
| HarfBuzz 8.0.0 through 14.6.0 contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the experimental WebAssembly shaper because the font_glyph_to_string import has a wrong WAMR signature. Attackers can supply a crafted font whose wasm module places the output buffer near linear memory's end, writing glyph-name bytes into host memory to crash or corrupt applications. |
| Raptor RDF Syntax Library from 2.0.15 through 2.0.16 contains a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in raptor_new_term_from_counted_literal() caused by truncating language tag length to an unsigned char. Attackers can supply Turtle, TriG, N-Triples or N-Quads documents with language tags of 256 bytes or longer to corrupt heap memory, crash applications, and possibly execute code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libata-scsi: bound the ATA passthru sense descriptor writes
When an ATA PASS-THROUGH command to an ATAPI device fails, the sense
buffer holds the device's REQUEST SENSE reply, and
ata_scsi_set_passthru_sense_fields() trusts its additional length
byte, sb[7], when adding the ATA Status Return descriptor. A faulty
or malicious device can use that to make the kernel read and write
past the 96-byte buffer in three ways:
- scsi_sense_desc_find() is passed sb[7] + 8 as the buffer length, so
its clamp against sb[7] does nothing and the walk runs off the end.
- A type-9 descriptor found near the end is filled in unchecked.
- A new descriptor at sb[8 + len] needs len + 22 bytes, not len + 14,
so len 75..82 writes up to 8 bytes past the end.
Reproduced with KASAN under qemu, with the emulated ATAPI REQUEST SENSE
reply patched:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in scsi_sense_desc_find+0x1a5/0x210
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ata_scsi_qc_complete+0x1a15/0x1a50
Both are gone with this patch, and a valid descriptor is still filled
in. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. An attacker in physical proximity may be able to cause a denial-of-service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: clamp freelist reconstruction requests
The firmware reconstruction count controls accesses to the request's
fixed freelist ID array and the copy into the fixed response array.
Neither access currently bounds the count to those protocol arrays.
Clamp the count to the request capacity, which is shared by the response
layout, and use that count consistently for reconstruction and response
publication. Keep the firmware recovery exchange instead of dropping an
oversized request without a response, as discussed with the firmware
maintainer.
The issue was found by our static-analysis tool. |
| The OSDP Control Panel reply parser cp_decode_response() in subsys/mgmt/osdp/src/osdp_cp.c decodes replies from a Peripheral Device into a stack-allocated struct osdp_event. For the REPLY_KEYPPAD and REPLY_RAW reply types, the payload length is taken from the received frame and the only validation performed is that the declared length is self-consistent with the number of payload bytes present in the frame. Because the attacker controls both the length field and the frame length, that check imposes no bound, and the subsequent memcpy() writes into the fixed 64-byte data arrays of struct osdp_event_keypress / struct osdp_event_cardread (OSDP_EVENT_MAX_DATALEN). The sibling REPLY_FMT handler in the same switch already carried the missing > OSDP_EVENT_MAX_DATALEN bound.
The defect is reached from cp_process_reply(), which reads bytes from the OSDP RS-485 channel and passes them through osdp_phy_check_packet() and osdp_phy_decode_packet() before dispatching on the reply ID. Triggering it requires CONFIG_OSDP with CONFIG_OSDP_MODE_CP and an application event callback registered (the normal Control Panel integration), plus a frame carrying a correct SOM, a valid CRC-16, and a matching 2-bit sequence number — all of which are computable or observable by anyone on the bus. No check ties the reply ID to the outstanding command, so an oversized REPLY_KEYPPAD or REPLY_RAW is accepted as the answer to a routine CMD_POLL. A malicious or compromised card reader, or anyone with access to the RS-485 wiring, can supply such a frame; CONFIG_OSDP_SC_ENABLED only helps while a secure channel is active, and a single unauthenticated frame carrying a bad MAC causes sc_deactivate(), after which plaintext replies are again accepted.
With the default CONFIG_OSDP_UART_BUFFER_LENGTH of 256, roughly 180 bytes of fully attacker-chosen data can be written past the end of the stack-allocated event object, over saved registers and the return address on typical Cortex-M and RISC-V frame layouts (Zephyr does not enable stack canaries by default). The impact ranges from a hard crash of the access-control panel to potential control-flow hijack in the context of the OSDP receive thread. The fix adds an OSDP_EVENT_MAX_DATALEN bound to both handlers, capping each memcpy() at the size of its destination. |
| Numeric truncation of the buffer length in the MPU buffer authorization check in FreeRTOS-Kernel V11.3.0 and V11.3.1 on the Arm Cortex-R82 (Armv8-R AArch64) MPU port might allow, under certain conditions, an unprivileged task on MPU-enabled builds to read or write privileged kernel memory beyond the validated buffer window, via a stream buffer system call.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version V11.3.2 or later. |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to unexpected behavior. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected app termination. |
| Out-of-bounds write in the query processing components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a threat actor to crash the driver by using specially crafted data that is processed by the driver during query operations.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| Out-of-bounds write in the streaming decoder component in aws-c-event-stream before 0.6.0 might allow a third party operating a server to cause memory corruption leading to arbitrary code execution on a client application that processes crafted event-stream messages.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 0.6.0 or later. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7 and iPadOS 26.7, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: fix size calculations for 64-bit attributes
net_dm_packet_report_fill() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_fill() use
nla_put_u64_64bit() to append 64-bit attributes (NET_DM_ATTR_PC and
NET_DM_ATTR_TIMESTAMP).
On 32-bit architectures without CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
nla_put_u64_64bit() may append a 4-byte NET_DM_ATTR_PAD attribute for
64-bit alignment.
However, net_dm_packet_report_size() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_size()
used nla_total_size(sizeof(u64)) instead of nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)),
budgeting 12 bytes instead of up to 16 bytes.
This under-estimation of SKB size can lead to an skb_over_panic() when
__nla_reserve() or skb_put() is subsequently called.
Fix this by using nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)) in both size calculations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size
recv_dless_read() receives a P_DATA_REPLY from a peer into the bio of an
outstanding read request. The peer-supplied payload length reaches it as
the signed int data_size, and two peer-controlled inputs can make it
negative. With a negotiated data-integrity-alg the digest length is
subtracted first, so a reply whose payload is smaller than the digest
underflows data_size. With no integrity algorithm (the default) data_size
is assigned from the unsigned h95/h100 wire length and drbdd() never
bounds it for a payload-carrying command, so a length above INT_MAX casts
it negative; this path needs no non-default feature. The bio receive loop
then computes expect = min_t(int, data_size, bv_len), which is negative,
and drbd_recv_all_warn(mapped, expect) receives with a size_t of SIZE_MAX
into the first mapped page.
The sibling receive path read_in_block() is not affected: it uses an
unsigned size and rejects it against DRBD_MAX_BIO_SIZE before receiving.
Reject a data reply whose size is negative after the optional digest
subtraction, covering both triggers.
Impact: a malicious or man-in-the-middle DRBD peer copies attacker-chosen
bytes past a bio page in the receiver, corrupting kernel memory. A node
that reads from its peer (a diskless node, or read-balancing to the peer)
is exposed in the default configuration; data-integrity-alg is not
required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/cmf: Fix virtual vs physical address confusion
The measurement block address is an absolute address. Define the
associated schib_config and schib fields as dma64_t to enable automatic
detection of incorrect assignments. Also add the missing virt_to_dma64()
translation.
Without this fix, a wrong address will be used by firmware when storing
extended format channel measurement data on kernels built with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_IDENTITY_BASE=y. |
