| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Use after free in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Layout in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Turbolev in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure
F_SETFL and FIOASYNC decide whether to invoke ->fasync() before
pipe_fasync() takes pipe->mutex. Two enables of one O_RDWR FIFO can
therefore both enter the callback.
fasync_helper() allocates before checking for an existing entry. If the
first enable installs both entries, a second enable can update the
reader entry and then fail the allocation for the writer entry. The
error path removes the pre-existing reader entry, clearing FASYNC while
the writer entry remains registered. __fput() then skips ->fasync(), so a
later pipe notification can dereference the freed file or its f_owner.
An unprivileged memory-pressure reproducer triggers a KASAN
slab-use-after-free in send_sigio() through this path.
Keep the reader helper's result and undo the registration only if this
call added it. The pipe mutex serializes changes to both lists, so a
failed new registration still removes its reader, while a failed
duplicate preserves the existing registrations and FASYNC. Successful
duplicate enables continue to update fa_fd as before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads
Recovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print()
walks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds
dlm->spinlock, but the recovery participant list is protected by
dlm_reco_state_lock. In particular, dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches
the list under dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the detached records after
releasing it. A concurrent debugfs open can therefore read freed memory.
Protect the participant traversal and field reads in debug_state_print()
with dlm_reco_state_lock, matching the existing list writers. This also
serializes the traversal against list_add_tail() during recovery-area
initialization. Make the existing lock available to the debug code
through dlmcommon.h; the lock remains internal to the OCFS2 DLM module.
Release dlm->spinlock after formatting the other domain state and before
acquiring dlm_reco_state_lock, so the debug reader does not nest the two
locks. Leave recovery list insertion, detachment and freeing unchanged.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10
full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310
do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0
? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10
vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020
? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
do_file_open+0x21e/0x470
? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0
do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0
? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60
__x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0
? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[Register dump omitted.]
</TASK>
Allocated by task 880:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90
dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
kthread+0x351/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 880:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x308/0x580
dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460
dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90
dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
kthread+0x351/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0)
[Page and memory-state dumps omitted.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix race in discovery auth updates
Separate configfs opens can concurrently update the discovery AuthMethod
parameter. Both callers may free the same value in
iscsi_update_param_value(), causing a double-free.
Protect the lookup and replacement with the discovery TPG access lock,
as used by the other TPG configfs parameter updates. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of
rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on
RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM
from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a
RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the
id the event was delivered on. That id is ic->i_cm_id, and nothing
clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a
freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and
rdma_destroy_id() on it.
The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect()
forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there
explains. Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so
the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect
gets a fresh one. |
| Use after free in Paint in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Video in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Compositing in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Modularization in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Browser in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in WTF in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Animation in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mcast: don't truncate the port group walk on teardown
__br_multicast_disable_port_ctx() and br_multicast_del_port() walk
port->mglist with hlist_for_each_entry_safe(). However,
br_multicast_find_del_pg() can also delete other entries from the same
list through br_multicast_fwd_src_remove() or __fwd_del_star_excl().
If such an entry is the iterator's saved next node, hlist_del_init()
clears its ->next and terminates the walk early. The reproducer triggers
this in both teardown walks, leaving port groups in the bridge mdb with
a dangling ->key.port after del_nbp() frees the port:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320
__mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320
br_mdb_dump+0x594/0xe40
rtnl_mdb_dump+0x1cf/0x5d0
Use hlist_del_init_rcu() to unlink the group while preserving ->next.
br_multicast_del_pg() and the teardown walks run under
br->multicast_lock. The GC worker must acquire the same lock before
detaching the group for destruction, so the node remains alive while
the walk uses the preserved pointer.
Preserving ->next means a walk can now reach a group that an earlier
iteration already deleted as a side effect. That group is off mp->ports,
so br_multicast_find_del_pg() would fall through its port scan and hit
the trailing WARN_ON(1). Skip such groups at the top of that helper: a
port group is put on port->mglist when it is created and only unlinked
when it is deleted, so hlist_unhashed() identifies exactly this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Fix mm reuse handling for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
A FUT_OFF_MMSHARED futex is a shared futex that refers to an MM.
It is possible for a process to wait on a shared futex with a different MM
because a FUT_OFF_INODE waiter can be requeued onto a FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
futex by another process.
This can cause FUT_OFF_MMSHARED waiters on a freed MM to consume
wakeups intended for a newly allocated MM at the same address.
Fix it by keying FUT_OFF_MMSHARED using a unique 64-bit per-MM ID.
Leave private futexes as before to avoid influencing the performance of the
hotpath.
(Multi-threaded processes typically implicitly use FUT_OFF_MMSHARED by
setting clear_child_tid such that it points into anonymous memory, which
causes mm_release() in a multi-threaded mm to perform FUTEX_WAKE.) |
| Use after free in Animation in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.73 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
unicode: free the map after a grace period
generic_ci_d_hash() and generic_ci_d_compare() read sb->s_encoding and
dereference the unicode map while a pathwalk in rcu mode holds nothing
but rcu_read_lock(). The filesystems that use them, ext4, f2fs and
tmpfs, drop the map with utf8_unload() from ->put_super(), which runs
when the last reference to the mount goes away. A lookup that is still
inside such a filesystem at that point reads a freed map.
With a pathwalk held up in utf8_casefold_hash() while the last reference
to a casefolded tmpfs goes away:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950
Read of size 8 at addr ff110001030fe658 by task walker/98
Call Trace:
<TASK>
utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950
utf8byte+0x160/0x1560
utf8_casefold_hash+0x167/0x230
generic_ci_d_hash+0xdd/0x1c0
link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30
path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00
filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
[...]
Allocated by task 94:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560
utf8_load+0x4e/0x570
shmem_parse_opt_casefold.isra.0+0x92/0x270
[...]
Freed by task 97:
kfree+0x1db/0x5b0
shmem_put_super+0x72/0x170
generic_shutdown_super+0x14c/0x530
kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60
deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0
cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130
So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period
in namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose
last reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir
out of a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker. So it is
reachable.
Delay the free until a grace period has passed. The map and the data
table it holds a reference to then outlive any pathwalk that found the
superblock before the mount went away. The reference on the data table
module is dropped from the rcu callback as well. utf8-core is built in
whenever CONFIG_UNICODE is set, so there is no module exit that would
have to wait for the callbacks.
Overlayfs points the s_encoding of an overlay at the map of its first
layer without taking a reference of its own. That stays correct. The
layer is held by the overlay, so its map is dropped only after the
overlay is gone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: core: fix race condition in split transaction handling
For a split transaction, either fw_core_handle_response() or
split_transaction_timeout_callback() may manipulate the same transaction
entry in the pending transaction list. The return value of timer_delete()
is used to determine which function handles the entry. If the transaction
is a split transaction and timer_delete() returns zero, the timeout
callback may already be running. In this case, the response handler must
leave the entry in the list for the timeout callback to remove.
A previous code refactoring broke this behavior, introducing a race
condition in which both functions could process the same transaction.
This could lead to a use-after-free on the transaction initiator side.
Fix the regression by ensuring that the response handler does not process
the transaction when timer_delete() returns zero. The timeout callback is
responsible for removing the entry from the pending transaction list. |
