| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The CoAP link-format helper match_path_uri() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c compares a registered resource path against the URI carried in a Uri-Query href= option. That URI is not NUL terminated, but the inner character loop advanced its index k once per path character without ever testing it against the option length len. When a registered path segment is longer than the supplied URI and the URI is a prefix of it, the loop reads uri[len] and beyond, past the end of the option value.
The path is reached from coap_well_known_core_get_len() and coap_well_known_core_get() via match_queries_resource(), i.e. by any unauthenticated GET /.well-known/core?href=/<prefix> request to a device that serves /.well-known/core (for the CoAP server subsystem, CONFIG_COAP_SERVER_WELL_KNOWN_CORE, default y) and has at least one resource that declares struct coap_core_metadata attributes.
The over-read does not reach the receive buffer. The well-known-core builders parse the query into a stack-local struct coap_option, whose value is a fixed array (value[12], or CONFIG_COAP_EXTENDED_OPTIONS_LEN_VALUE bytes) that the option bytes are copied into, so uri points into that copy. Reading past len therefore reads the unused, uninitialized tail of the array and, when the option fills it, the bytes just past it in the same stack frame. (In the ZoAP library of v1.8.0 to v1.9.x the option value was instead a pointer into the received packet, and the over-read ran past the option inside the packet buffer.)
The impact is bounded. The number of bytes read past the end is limited by the length of the resource path segment, and each additional byte is only read if it happens to equal the next path character, so in practice the over-read is one byte. It also cannot influence the response: returning a match requires the final compared index to be len - 1 or len, both in bounds, so out-of-bounds bytes only ever steer the loop to the next candidate resource. The consequence is undefined behaviour, not information disclosure and not a matching error.
The fix adds a k >= len guard at the top of the inner loop, so every uri[k] dereference is within the option value while still allowing a trailing * wildcard to match a longer path. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 13.0.0, Pillow's TIFF encoder can read beyond a ColorMap buffer when retained TIFF metadata has a plane size inconsistent with BitsPerSample. A small TIFF can be opened normally and then retain a crafted ColorMap that is reused when the image is saved. An application that re-encodes the attacker's TIFF with libtiff can trigger the out-of-bounds read. This can disclose heap memory in the output or crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 13.0.0 on Windows, src/PIL/WmfImagePlugin.py passes unchecked 32-bit WMF or EMF dimensions to the native drawwmf handler in src/display.c. The handler sizes a DIB allocation from 16-bit-truncated bcWidth and bcHeight fields but copies pixel data using the original full dimensions. A crafted wide, short metafile can pass the pixel-count decompression-bomb check and make the Windows-only renderer read beyond the heap buffer, potentially disclosing memory or crashing the process. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| llama.cpp before b3701 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in llama_decode_internal and llama_encode_internal that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read memory by supplying unvalidated token IDs. Attackers can send integer-array prompts to the llama-server /completion endpoint with IDs outside 0 to n_vocab to read embedding memory out of bounds or crash the process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Check PSC request indices against the actual size of the buffer
When processing Page State Change (PSC) requests, validate the PSC buffer
against the effective size of the scratch area, which could be less than
the maximum size if the guest provided a pointer that isn't exactly at the
start of the GHCB shared buffer. |
| php_openssl_matches_wildcard_name() in ext/openssl/xp_ssl.c underflows the length argument passed to memchr() when a TLS server certificate presents a wildcard name whose literal characters are together longer than the hostname being verified. A malicious server presenting such a certificate makes the PHP client read up to SIZE_MAX bytes past the end of a heap allocation. The path is reachable from any default client stream, because verify_peer_name is enabled by default. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR}
cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the
on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length.
The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(),
etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after
parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is
in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040
bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an
unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged
slab-out-of-bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250
sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190
____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620
Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes
are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the
computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on
failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by
pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct
bound.
Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five
standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR)
and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop
(DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check
because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).
The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to
validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1].
When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the
function instead of continuing to process later socket options. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the web management interface of affected Moxa wireless device servers. An authenticated remote attacker with low privileges could exploit insufficient bounds checking of user-supplied input, causing the web management service to become unresponsive. Restoring the service requires power cycling the affected device, while other device functions remain operational. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2, visionOS 27.2. Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected app termination. |
| libexpat before commit 13c5f63 contains a heap buffer over-read vulnerability in xmlparse.c. XML_ParseBuffer advances the parse buffer end with parser->m_bufferEnd += len using a caller-supplied length that is not validated against the allocated buffer size, so repeated XML_ParseBuffer calls move m_bufferEnd past the end of the heap allocation and subsequent parsing reads out of bounds. Reaching this path requires a parse buffer to already be present; otherwise XML_ParseBuffer returns XML_ERROR_NO_BUFFER. A buffer is present after a prior call to XML_GetBuffer, either directly (the common case) or indirectly through a prior XML_Parse call that allocates the buffer internally. The over-read discloses adjacent heap memory to the calling application, recovering heap pointers, libc function pointers, and code pointers sufficient to defeat ASLR and build further exploitation primitives. |
| FFmpeg before commit 983dae9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the AV1 RTP packetizer (libavformat/rtpenc_av1.c). The keyframe detection loop that searches for a sequence header OBU advanced its pointer and remaining-size counter by the encoded header length plus the OBU payload size without first bounding the OBU size against the remaining data. A crafted OBU size causes the remaining-size counter to wrap to a positive value, causing the next loop iteration to dereference a pointer beyond the end of the packet buffer. A crafted AV1 input packet muxed to RTP triggers the out-of-bounds read. |
| FFmpeg before commit 65b0dab contains an out-of-bounds read in the DASH demuxer (libavformat/dashdec.c). When a live DASH manifest is refreshed with a startNumber that is lower than the previous value, the current sequence number is driven negative. The fragment retrieval function checked only the upper bound before indexing the fragments array, allowing a negative index to be used and causing an out-of-bounds read. A malicious or misconfigured DASH server can trigger this by serving a live manifest with a decreasing startNumber across a manifest refresh. |
| FFmpeg before commit 1cdeb3c contains a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the VC-2/Dirac RTP packetizer (libavformat/rtpenc_vc2hq.c) that allows attackers to trigger memory corruption by supplying a crafted Dirac data unit. The packetizer copies an input-derived data unit or fragment size into a fixed-size buffer without an upper bound check, causing a heap buffer overflow when the crafted input is packetized for RTP output. |
| FFmpeg before commit 1c10bcc contains a heap buffer overflow in the RIST protocol reader (libavformat/librist.c). librist_read() ignored its size argument and copied the full received payload length into the caller-provided destination buffer, overflowing it when the payload exceeds the destination size. This is reachable via the async:rist:// URL scheme, where the async wrapper supplies a smaller buffer than the received payload. A remote RIST sender can trigger the overflow by sending a packet whose payload exceeds the caller buffer size. |
| FFmpeg before commit 9d786e4 contains a stack buffer overflow in the MPEG-PS muxer (libavformat/mpegenc.c). When muxing input with more streams than the muxer's fixed-size stack buffer accommodates, the buffer is overflowed. A crafted input with an excessive number of streams triggers the overflow during MPEG-PS muxing. |
| FFmpeg before commit acf5d7c contains a heap buffer overflow in the hvcC box writer. When writing an HEVC configuration record with more NAL units of a single type than the count field can represent, the NAL unit count overflows, causing a heap buffer overflow. A crafted HEVC input file triggers the overflow during muxing. |
| hashcat master branch builds after v7.1.2 contain a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the KeePass AESKDF/KDBX v4 module (module 34301) that allows attackers to corrupt adjacent heap memory by supplying an oversized ninth hash field token. The module accepts up to 600 hex characters for the ninth token field but decodes it into a fixed 256-byte buffer with no length check, allowing a maximal input to write up to 44 bytes past the buffer boundary into adjacent esalt fields and heap chunk metadata, potentially enabling heap corruption or memory access violations. |
| Libpff through 20260926 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in libpff_table_read_values_array because a 7c column definition's values_array_size is not checked against remaining buffer bytes. Attackers can supply a crafted PST, OST or PAB file to make applications read adjacent heap memory into record entry values or crash. |
| Multiple AiDot devices are vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow via SSDP location header parsing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: core: Add validation for host-provided max_segs
The max_segs field is of type unsigned short, and if a host driver
sets an excessively large value, it may be truncated to zero. This
can cause mmc_alloc_sg() to call kmalloc_objs() with a zero size
allocation request, which leads to undefined behavior.
Under the SLUB allocator, kmalloc(0) returns a special pointer
(ZERO_SIZE_PTR). The subsequent 'if (sg)' check will evaluate to
true, and sg_init_table() will then attempt to access invalid memory,
resulting in a crash:
dwmmc_rockchip 2a310000.mmc: Successfully tuned phase to 133
mmc1: new UHS-I speed SDR104 SDHC card at address aaaa
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000001ffffffff0
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000102c88000
[0000001ffffffff0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 102 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-next-20260331-00013-g4d93c25963c5-dirty #80 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3576 EVB V10 Board (DT)
Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50
lr : sg_init_table+0x24/0x50
sp : ffff8000837db710
x29: ffff8000837db710 x28: 000000000000c000 x27: 0000000000000300
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff0000c46a0000
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000c0c73c00 x21: 0000000000000010
x20: 0000000000000010 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000002c
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000400 x13: ffff8000837dc000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff0000c0c73ca0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : 459ec1f0abbdbb00
x8 : 0000001fffffffe0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 0000000000035579 x4 : 0000000000000901 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000010
Call trace:
sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50 (P)
mmc_mq_init_request+0x64/0x90
blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs+0x3ac/0x480
blk_mq_alloc_set_map_and_rqs+0x98/0x1e0
blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x1c0/0x290
mmc_init_queue+0x120/0x370
mmc_blk_alloc_req+0x150/0x420
To prevent this, add a validation check in mmc_mq_init_request() to
detect when sg_len (derived from max_segs) is zero. If sg_len is zero,
we return an error and print an error message, allowing host driver
developers to identify and fix incorrect max_segs configuration.
This is a defensive measure that ensures the MMC core fails gracefully
when host drivers provide invalid max_segs values, rather than crashing
with a page fault. |
