| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block
bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control
block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL.
ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit
a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites
last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes
and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it.
Unshare the skb before writing the control block.
Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same
skb while earlier copies are still in the ring:
modprobe pktgen
pg=/proc/net/pktgen
echo "add_device eth0" > $pg/kpktgend_0
echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0
echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0
echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0
echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0
echo start > $pg/pgctrl &
sleep 5
echo stop > $pg/pgctrl
wait
cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight
inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at
zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-crypt: fix a tiny race condition in crypt_dec_pending
crypt_dec_pending reads io->error before calling atomic_dec_and_test.
Another context, for example crypt_endio called from an interrupt, may
set io->error and drop its reference between the read and the
decrement. crypt_dec_pending then drops the last reference and completes
the bio with the stale status - so a read that failed and was never
decrypted, or a write that failed, is reported as successful.
The read was placed before the decrement by commit b35f8caa0890 ("dm
crypt: wait for endio to complete before destruction"), because that
commit freed dm_crypt_io before calling bio_endio. This is no longer the
case, dm_crypt_io lives in the per-bio data now.
Read io->error after atomic_dec_and_test instead. atomic_dec_and_test is
fully ordered, so no additional barrier is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves out can't take over a lock
Since commit c62a4766937e ("move_mount: transfer MNT_LOCKED") a mount
can be moved beneath a locked mount. The lock moves from the old cover
to the new mount which takes over the job of hiding what's under it and
the old cover can be unmounted. That works as long as the new mount
stays. But the caller picks the new mount and copy_tree() leaves a
mount of a mount namespace file out of every copy made without
CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE, together with everything mounted on it, and never
looks at MNT_LOCKED. unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and mount propagation make
such copies.
So a task that is root in its own user namespace gets rid of a locked
cover on a file without a race and without touching the filesystem
below it. It makes a child with a mount namespace of its own, binds the
child's /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt beneath the cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH,
which hands the lock to that bind, and calls unshare(CLONE_NEWNS). The
new mount namespace has nothing on the file. That's the usual way to
mask a single file, a bind of /dev/null or of an empty file. With a
bind of an ordinary file the file stays covered.
copy_tree() already refuses to leave out a locked unbindable mount with
-EPERM since commit df7342b24018 ("mount: Don't allow copying
MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts"). Do the same for a locked mount of a
mount namespace file. That also covers a tree copied with
CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE and attached into a mount namespace of another user
namespace where lock_mnt_tree() locks it. Note that unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)
and clone(CLONE_NEWNS) fail with EPERM from such a mount namespace from
then on. The mount can't be left out and it can't be unmounted.
And refuse to move a mount of a mount namespace file beneath a locked
mount in the first place. Otherwise the task ends up with a mount it
can't unmount and an unshare() that fails for good.
Chris also found a second mount that goes away by itself, a clone of an
automounted mount that shrink_submounts() took along with its parent.
Commit f78ddcc87224 ("namespace: never expire a locked mount") took
care of that one.
Chris's reproducer is appended. Mode nsfile reads SECRET after the
unshare() on 7.3-rc7, with this patch the move_mount() fails with
EINVAL and the file stays covered. nsfile-control uses an ordinary file
and reads MASK both ways.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Get rid of a locked cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH.
*
* The "admin" (root) makes a tmpfs W:
* W/D file, holds SECRET, covered by a bind of a file with MASK
* W/Dd/inner file, holds SECRET, Dd is covered by a bind of a directory
* whose "inner" holds MASK
* W/own directory of uid 1000 with the file "mine" and the
* directory "minedir", whose "inner" holds MINE
* W/dbg debugfs, mode 755. dbg/tracing is an automount point
* The "attacker" is uid 1000. It enters a new user namespace with a new mount
* namespace, so W and both covers are locked there.
*
* usage: prog MODE
* plain put a bind of own/mine beneath the cover of D, unmount the cover
* nsfile put a bind of the mount namespace file of a child beneath the
* cover of D, then unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)
* nsfile-control the same with a bind of own/mine
* shrink put a bind of the automounted tracefs beneath the cover of Dd,
* unmount the cover, put a tmpfs beneath W, call umount(W), which fails
* shrink-control the same with a bind of own/minedir
* The environment variable AUTOMOUNT_DIR names another automount point for "shrink".
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
---truncated--- |
| Use after free in Windows Storage allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix data corruption with concurrent writes and O_TRUNC
cifs_do_truncate() flushes dirty pages with filemap_write_and_wait()
and truncates the file on the server, but in the old code both
operations ran without holding i_rwsem or invalidate_lock. A
concurrent buffered write via netfs_perform_write() -- which only
needs i_rwsem shared -- could dirty new pages after the flush but
before the local truncation, and those pages would be silently
discarded by cifs_setsize() -> truncate_pagecache().
Fix by acquiring inode_lock (exclusive i_rwsem) and
filemap_invalidate_lock at the top of cifs_do_truncate(), so the
entire flush-truncate-resize sequence is atomic with respect to:
- buffered writes (blocked by exclusive i_rwsem, since
netfs_start_io_write takes i_rwsem shared),
- read page faults (blocked by exclusive invalidate_lock, since
filemap_fault takes it shared),
- writeback collection (blocked by netfs_wb_begin/netfs_wb_end
around the server truncate and local resize, since
netfs_writepages also acquires the wb lock). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix hist trigger timestamps for buffered events
Syzkaller triggered a WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest) warning:
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:821 at ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
Call trace:
ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
hist_field_timestamp
hist_fn_call
event_hist_trigger
event_triggers_call
__event_trigger_test_discard
trace_event_buffer_commit
do_trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch
trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch
The warning is probabilistically reproducible and is related to syzkaller
executing the following commands:
echo 'prev_pid == 999999' > events/sched/sched_switch/filter
echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
The specific triggering process is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
(context switching) (echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > \
events/sched/sched_switch/trigger)
do_trace_event_raw_event_##call
trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve
if (!tr->no_filter_buffering_ref &&
trace_file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FILTERED)
return entry; // return directly
event_hist_trigger_parse
hist_register_trigger
tracing_set_filter_buffering(file->tr, true);
tr->no_filter_buffering_ref++;
__trace_buffer_lock_reserve
rb_start_commit
local_inc(&cpu_buffer->committing); // skipped and not executed
trace_event_buffer_commit
__event_trigger_test_discard
event_triggers_call
event_hist_trigger
hist_fn_call
hist_field_timestamp
ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
nest = local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest) // trigger warning
The root cause is that when an event file has a filter attached and the
hist trigger has not yet been attached, trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve()
writes the event into the per-CPU trace_buffered_event temp buffer instead
of reserving it in the ring buffer, so cpu_buffer->committing is not
incremented. When the event is later processed at commit time by a hist
trigger, hist_field_timestamp() -> ring_buffer_event_time_stamp() sees a
zero committing count, triggering WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest).
tracing_event_time_stamp() was added by commit d8279bfc5e959 ("tracing:
Add tracing_event_time_stamp() API") for exactly this case: if the event
is the per-CPU trace_buffered_event, it returns the current ring buffer
timestamp. But it never gained a caller. Use it in hist_field_timestamp(),
so that a hist trigger that races onto a buffered event records the
current time, which is only marginally later than when the event was
recorded, instead of warning and recording a bogus timestamp. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Connected Devices Platform Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Fix page dirtying in sev_gmem_post_populate()
set_page_dirty() requires that the caller holds some kind of lock to
ensure that the page's mapping does not concurrently go away.
That is not the case for a random page we got from get_user_pages_fast(),
so use set_page_dirty_lock().
[sean: tag for stable] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
autofs: ignore notification errors from a replaced pipe
autofs_notify_daemon() takes a reference to the current notification
pipe under wq_mutex, then drops the mutex before writing the request. The
write can block while the daemon enters catatonic mode and installs a
replacement pipe.
If the old pipe's reader is then closed, the delayed write returns -EPIPE
and the generic error path enters catatonic mode again. That transition
acts on the current superblock state, closes the replacement pipe, and
releases the new daemon generation's wait queues.
Only enter catatonic mode when the pipe which failed is still the current
pipe. Factor the already-locked transition so the identity check and state
change are atomic with respect to another replacement.
This was reproduced on v7.3-rc5-337-gff47652a4b66c in a local QEMU guest.
An unprivileged UID 65534 lookup filled the old packet pipe before a
normal CATATONIC/SETPIPEFD restart. On the unmodified kernel, the new pipe
received HUP and both a pending victim lookup and a later lookup failed
with ENOENT in two out of two fresh-mount runs.
With this change, the new pipe remained active, received an intact
304-byte request, and both victim lookups completed in two out of two
runs. Normal lookup and restart-without-a-blocked-writer controls passed.
No KASAN, oops, refcount, or lock diagnostic was observed. A source
reproducer and complete local logs are available privately on request.
The demonstrated impact is limited to denial of a shared autofs service
during a legitimate daemon restart. No memory corruption, information leak,
privilege escalation, or code execution primitive was observed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_setattr_size()
ntfs_setattr_size() updates i_size and resizes the on-disk attribute
without holding mapping->invalidate_lock. Page faults take the lock
shared, so a fault racing the resize can resolve a VCN against the
transient runlist state of ntfs_non_resident_attr_expand() and fail
with a spurious SIGBUS, and can interleave with the size-change
epilogue (truncate_pagecache(), i_size_write(),
pagecache_isize_extended()).
Take invalidate_lock exclusively around the whole resize after
inode_dio_wait(), matching the fallocate path and other filesystems
such as xfs, which wraps truncate in its mmaplock (= invalidate_lock). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established
Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().
Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.
list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
Call Trace:
vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
kthread+0x36e/0x470
ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: fix data race and NULL deref on local->assoc_dev
local->assoc_dev is shared between the association path and the
association-response worker without common synchronization.
mac802154_perform_association() stores the coordinator pointer and waits
for a response. Its timeout and error paths clear the pointer and return
to mac802154_associate(), which may then free the coordinator object.
Meanwhile, mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() may observe the associating bit
and enter mac802154_process_association_resp(), which dereferences
assoc_dev.
The worker's bit test and the handler's pointer dereference are not
atomic with respect to cleanup. Cleanup can clear assoc_dev between them,
causing a NULL dereference, or free the coordinator while the response
handler still uses the pointer.
The recorded result is exposed to the same window. assoc_status and
assoc_addr are written by the handler but read by the association path
while the associating bit is still set, so a second response for the same
request - a malicious one, for instance - can replace them between those
reads and leave the caller with an incoherent status and address pair.
The response handler only needs the coordinator extended address.
Replace assoc_dev with a cached address, removing the pointer lifetime
dependency. Protect the cached address and the associating bit with a
dedicated spinlock. A READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pair would not guarantee
an atomic __le64 access on all 32-bit architectures.
wpan_dev->association_lock cannot be reused here: nl802154_associate()
holds it across rdev_associate(), hence for the whole of
mac802154_perform_association() including the wait for the response.
A response handler taking that lock would only get it once the
association has already given up.
Reset the completion, publish the cached address, and set the associating
bit while holding the lock. The response handler takes the lock, rechecks
the bit and the cached address, records the response, clears the bit, and
only then completes the waiter. Thus cleanup cannot pass the handler
between its state check and completion, and the cached 64-bit value
cannot tear.
The handler clears the bit before completing, not the woken waiter:
otherwise complete() is issued under the lock and a second (e.g.
malicious) response can reacquire it before the waiter and replace the
result. So a wait that returns success implies the bit is already clear,
and the success and negative-response paths return directly. The
transmit-error and timeout paths still clear it under assoc_lock, which
serializes any racing response against the cleanup while the call returns
the error it already selected. Both paths snapshot assoc_status and
assoc_addr under the same lock.
Both users run in process context, so a plain spinlock is sufficient.
The lock is not held while waiting for the completion. |
| Race condition in the IPC component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159, Firefox ESR 153.6, Thunderbird 159, and Thunderbird 153.6. |
| A vulnerability has been found in a2aproject a2a-js up to 1.1.0. Impacted is the function ResultManager.applyStatusUpdate of the file src/server/result_manager.ts of the component Task Status Update Handler. Such manipulation leads to race condition. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.2.0 is recommended to address this issue. The name of the patch is 7b87c9480bfa643f9d2b2eaf06988b3d3a95de25. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock versions from 4.1.0 can reuse a stale observation when an attacker pre-dates and removes its own marker, at least two lock-user processes are waiting, coarse or matching modification times preserve the observation, and an honest contender creates a fresh marker on the reused inode, causing that live marker to be removed as stale. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in a2aproject a2a-java up to 1.2.0.Final. This impacts the function TaskManager.saveTaskEvent. The manipulation leads to race condition. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.3.0.Final will fix this issue. The identifier of the patch is 6b8e1e085c35e970ef0048901cd25850e4791ec2. The affected component should be upgraded. |
| @fastify/session is a session plugin for Fastify. In all releases before 11.1.6, with the default rolling session behavior, a request that restored a session before a logout could save its own copy after another request had completed the session destroy call, recreating the destroyed session identifier with its authenticated data. An attacker who already holds a victim's valid signed session cookie and keeps a request in flight across the logout can replay that cookie to restore the session after it was meant to be revoked, without any cookie theft or signature forgery. The issue is fixed in @fastify/session 11.1.6, which adds a per session generation marker and a conditional store write so a session restored before a logout or regeneration cannot recreate or overwrite the current entry, and users should upgrade to 11.1.6 or later. There is no workaround, and custom session stores must implement the new conditional write. |
| A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An attacker may tamper with code-signed applications to execute arbitrary code in the application's context. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved locking. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or corrupt process memory. |
