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Search Results (417330 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99154 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt A transport that implements parse_pdu_itt hands libiscsi an index taken from the PDU, and both lookups bound it from above only: if (i >= session->cmds_max) i and cmds_max are both int, so a negative index passes and session->cmds[i] is read from before the array. be2iscsi produces one. beiscsi_parse_pdu() assigns the raw tag, *index = (int)itt; and beiscsi_complete_pdu() forwards an unsolicited NOP-In from the hardware async ring without replacing its ITT, so the value is the target's. It also reports the session's own age rather than the one in the tag, which leaves the age comparison in iscsi_verify_itt() with nothing to reject. Bound the index from below in both lookups. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99153 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU A Reject PDU carries a copy of the header it rejects, and iscsi_handle_reject() takes the ITT out of that copy to find the task to clean up: memcpy(&rejected_pdu, data, sizeof(struct iscsi_hdr)); ... task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt); That value is whatever the target put there. iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and checks nothing else, so any task in the pool can be named, and iscsi_nop_out_rsp() then completes it. An index that has never been used gives a NULL task->conn: the pool is zeroed at session setup and conn is assigned only when a task is allocated. If the task was used and returned, iscsi_complete_task() hits its WARN_ON_ONCE(task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE) and the refcount underflows. An in-flight SCSI command is completed as successful - a 1 MiB read returned 1048576 with none of its buffer written and no warning. Validate the reflected ITT the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() validates a command ITT, and require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command. [ 6.248477] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 6.249357] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067] [ 6.249951] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 6.250718] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 6.251616] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160 [ 6.252043] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00 [ 6.252813] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907b80 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 6.253042] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800607e000 RCX: ffffffff8d571a25 [ 6.253345] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88806c907c38 RDI: 0000000000000060 [ 6.253642] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff235a504 [ 6.253947] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 7463656e6e6f6320 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 6.254251] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88806c907c38 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 6.254549] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d95bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.254887] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.255140] CR2: 00007fc393e8ffc0 CR3: 0000000005252006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 6.255439] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6.255564] Call Trace: [ 6.255674] <IRQ> [ 6.255768] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x18bf/0x22a0 [ 6.256733] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0 [ 6.256905] iscsi_tcp_data_recv_done+0xf4/0x250 [ 6.257103] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0 [ 6.257680] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390 [ 6.258061] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 [ 6.258853] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510 [ 6.259808] tcp_data_queue+0x1f13/0x4cd0 [ 6.260567] tcp_rcv_established+0x8a5/0x3a00 [ 6.261931] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960 [ 6.262269] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-99152 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response __iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one place and checks only that the index resolved: case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN: task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt); if (!task) return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT; iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at nothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one that has never been used. task->conn is then NULL, and both iscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One unsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT crashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead. Require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes. [ 6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067] [ 6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160 [ 6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00 [ 6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020 [ 6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060 [ 6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800 [ 6.298707] FS: 00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.298710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 6.298712] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6.298713] Call Trace: [ 6.298714] <IRQ> [ 6.298714] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0 [ 6.298758] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0 [ 6.298759] iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80 [ 6.298778] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0 [ 6.298800] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390 [ 6.298804] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 [ 6.298812] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510 [ 6.298814] tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00 [ 6.298842] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960 [ 6.298847] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-99150 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: don't drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read() drops its runtime PM reference right after reading the wave registers. When copying them to userspace fails, it jumps to the err label, which drops the reference a second time. A read into a bad buffer on Navi31 either steals a reference somebody else holds (power/runtime_usage goes from 1 to 0) or underflows the count: amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: Runtime PM usage count underflow! The registers are already in the kernel buffer at that point, so finish the hardware access first and copy the buffer with a single copy_to_user() instead of the put_user() loop with its own error path. (cherry picked from commit 31035bbd74f7c3e10c163db875b8e67f8b50ee6a) | ||||
| CVE-2026-99147 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/exec: don't immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs When a contention is detected the drm_exec object grabs a reference to the contended object, unlocks all other objects and pre-locks the contended one before anything else. The problem is that it is possible that this pre-locked object was about to be destroyed and drm_exec is now holding the last reference to it. So we never actually see this pre-locked object again to be explicitly locked and so also never reserve a slot for a dma_fence object on it. Should the driver now use drm_exec_for_each_locked_object() to add a new fence to all locked objects we eventually see a warning or even a BUG_ON() to prevent random memory corruption. Fix this by keeping the prelocked object out of the array of locked objs until it was explicitly mentioned by the driver again. If the prelocked object is never mentioned again by the driver just unlock and drop the reference at the end of the locking loop. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99143 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Keep the predicate limit separate from program capacity predicate_parse() adds two to nr_preds to reserve the terminal TRUE and FALSE entries. It also uses that increased value as the limit for parsed predicates. If the initial count is smaller than the number actually parsed, the program can fill the allocation and subsequent accesses can go past its end. Keep nr_preds as the predicate limit and use a separate value for the allocation size. This leaves space for both terminal entries and a zeroed entry when parsing stops at the limit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99142 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Check operator stack capacity before pushing predicate_parse() uses the first operator stack entry before processing any opening parentheses. A push then increments top before writing. The existing check still permits that write when top already points to the last allocated entry, which can access beyond the operator stack. Reject the push when top reaches the last allocated entry. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99140 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 1.9 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix hist trigger timestamps for buffered events Syzkaller triggered a WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest) warning: WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:821 at ring_buffer_event_time_stamp Call trace: ring_buffer_event_time_stamp hist_field_timestamp hist_fn_call event_hist_trigger event_triggers_call __event_trigger_test_discard trace_event_buffer_commit do_trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch The warning is probabilistically reproducible and is related to syzkaller executing the following commands: echo 'prev_pid == 999999' > events/sched/sched_switch/filter echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > events/sched/sched_switch/trigger The specific triggering process is as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 (context switching) (echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > \ events/sched/sched_switch/trigger) do_trace_event_raw_event_##call trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve if (!tr->no_filter_buffering_ref && trace_file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FILTERED) return entry; // return directly event_hist_trigger_parse hist_register_trigger tracing_set_filter_buffering(file->tr, true); tr->no_filter_buffering_ref++; __trace_buffer_lock_reserve rb_start_commit local_inc(&cpu_buffer->committing); // skipped and not executed trace_event_buffer_commit __event_trigger_test_discard event_triggers_call event_hist_trigger hist_fn_call hist_field_timestamp ring_buffer_event_time_stamp nest = local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing); WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest) // trigger warning The root cause is that when an event file has a filter attached and the hist trigger has not yet been attached, trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve() writes the event into the per-CPU trace_buffered_event temp buffer instead of reserving it in the ring buffer, so cpu_buffer->committing is not incremented. When the event is later processed at commit time by a hist trigger, hist_field_timestamp() -> ring_buffer_event_time_stamp() sees a zero committing count, triggering WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest). tracing_event_time_stamp() was added by commit d8279bfc5e959 ("tracing: Add tracing_event_time_stamp() API") for exactly this case: if the event is the per-CPU trace_buffered_event, it returns the current ring buffer timestamp. But it never gained a caller. Use it in hist_field_timestamp(), so that a hist trigger that races onto a buffered event records the current time, which is only marginally later than when the event was recorded, instead of warning and recording a bogus timestamp. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99139 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN data-race issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99138 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load the icsk_ca_ops pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99136 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt: fix a tiny race condition in crypt_dec_pending crypt_dec_pending reads io->error before calling atomic_dec_and_test. Another context, for example crypt_endio called from an interrupt, may set io->error and drop its reference between the read and the decrement. crypt_dec_pending then drops the last reference and completes the bio with the stale status - so a read that failed and was never decrypted, or a write that failed, is reported as successful. The read was placed before the decrement by commit b35f8caa0890 ("dm crypt: wait for endio to complete before destruction"), because that commit freed dm_crypt_io before calling bio_endio. This is no longer the case, dm_crypt_io lives in the per-bio data now. Read io->error after atomic_dec_and_test instead. atomic_dec_and_test is fully ordered, so no additional barrier is needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99135 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix infinite loop on discard with large tag size When integrity_metadata handles a discard, it fills a buffer with DISCARD_FILLER and writes it over the tags, max_blocks blocks at a time. If the kmalloc fails, the buffer is the on-stack array checksums_onstack and max_size is set to HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE. So if the tag size is larger than HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, max_blocks is zero, bi_size is never decremented and the loop never terminates. Fix this by using sizeof(checksums_onstack) as max_size. The array has MAX_TAG_SIZE bytes since commit b93b6643e9b5 ("dm integrity: fix a crash with unusually large tag size"), so max_blocks is at least 1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99134 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: fix data race and NULL deref on local->assoc_dev local->assoc_dev is shared between the association path and the association-response worker without common synchronization. mac802154_perform_association() stores the coordinator pointer and waits for a response. Its timeout and error paths clear the pointer and return to mac802154_associate(), which may then free the coordinator object. Meanwhile, mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() may observe the associating bit and enter mac802154_process_association_resp(), which dereferences assoc_dev. The worker's bit test and the handler's pointer dereference are not atomic with respect to cleanup. Cleanup can clear assoc_dev between them, causing a NULL dereference, or free the coordinator while the response handler still uses the pointer. The recorded result is exposed to the same window. assoc_status and assoc_addr are written by the handler but read by the association path while the associating bit is still set, so a second response for the same request - a malicious one, for instance - can replace them between those reads and leave the caller with an incoherent status and address pair. The response handler only needs the coordinator extended address. Replace assoc_dev with a cached address, removing the pointer lifetime dependency. Protect the cached address and the associating bit with a dedicated spinlock. A READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pair would not guarantee an atomic __le64 access on all 32-bit architectures. wpan_dev->association_lock cannot be reused here: nl802154_associate() holds it across rdev_associate(), hence for the whole of mac802154_perform_association() including the wait for the response. A response handler taking that lock would only get it once the association has already given up. Reset the completion, publish the cached address, and set the associating bit while holding the lock. The response handler takes the lock, rechecks the bit and the cached address, records the response, clears the bit, and only then completes the waiter. Thus cleanup cannot pass the handler between its state check and completion, and the cached 64-bit value cannot tear. The handler clears the bit before completing, not the woken waiter: otherwise complete() is issued under the lock and a second (e.g. malicious) response can reacquire it before the waiter and replace the result. So a wait that returns success implies the bit is already clear, and the success and negative-response paths return directly. The transmit-error and timeout paths still clear it under assoc_lock, which serializes any racing response against the cleanup while the call returns the error it already selected. Both paths snapshot assoc_status and assoc_addr under the same lock. Both users run in process context, so a plain spinlock is sufficient. The lock is not held while waiting for the completion. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99133 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update iucv_sock_recvmsg() sends the HiperSockets-only AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN without testing the transport, so on a classic z/VM socket iucv_send_ctrl() sizes the skb through a NULL iucv->hs_dev. SO_MSGLIMIT accepts 1, so msglimit / 2 is zero and one recvmsg() on its own socket is enough for an unprivileged process to take a spurious disconnect. It also calls iucv_send_ctrl() under spin_lock_bh(&message_q.lock), which allocates GFP_KERNEL inside a section the code treats as atomic. Sending outside that lock lets two recvmsg() reach afiucv_hs_send() at once, where msg_recv is sampled for the advertised window and subtracted after dev_queue_xmit() -- and sendmsg reaches that counter under lock_sock() while recvmsg holds no socket lock, so both can subtract the same value, the counter goes negative and the credit reaches the peer twice. Test the transport, claim the credit with atomic_xchg() after the last error exit and hand it back if the transmit fails, and send once the lock is dropped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99132 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't hold buffer locks across sync transaction commit in xfs_sync_sb_buf xfs_sync_sb_buf() holds sb/rtsb buffer locks across a synchronous xfs_trans_commit(), which flushes the CIL push workqueue internally. If shutdown occurs during the CIL push, xfs_buf_item_unpin() needs to lock these buffers to fail them, causing a deadlock: setlabel: holds buf lock -> flush_workqueue(xfs-cil) CIL push worker: xfs_buf_item_unpin -> xfs_buf_lock(same buf) Remove the xfs_trans_bhold() calls so that commit releases the buffer locks normally. After the sync commit, re-acquire the buffers via mp->m_sb_bp / mp->m_rtsb_bp for the on-disk writeback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99131 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix capability check in xfs An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group's quota by changing a file's gid to a different group id the same user belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the file's size was big enough to exceed the quota's hardlimit. Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages. Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell: capable() - Tests the task's effective credentials has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task's real credentials This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively bypassing quota accounting checks. Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent selinux audit messages. This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit() | ||||
| CVE-2026-99130 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/cancel: don't spin on local work the task can't run io_uring_cancel_generic() refuses to sleep while any ring on the exiting task's tctx has local work pending. It assumes the task is that ring's submitter and that the next io_uring_try_cancel_requests() pass will run the work. This does not hold for a ring that was still IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED when the task got its tctx node from io_uring_create() or io_ringfd_register(). The submitter is set later by IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS, possibly from another task, and only the submitter may run local work on an IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN ring. To the exiting task the work stays pending forever, the loop never reaches schedule(), and the task trips the WARN_ON_ONCE() once and then spins in do_exit(). An unprivileged user can set this up at will by creating a disabled ring, having a child enable it and stop, posting to the ring with IORING_OP_MSG_RING and exiting with a request in flight that only the child can complete. The exiting thread burns a CPU until the child runs or dies, and with panic_on_warn set the WARN panics the kernel. Fix by skipping the sleep only when io_allowed_defer_tw_run() allows the task to run the work. This is reasonable since work it cannot run cannot complete any of its requests either, so nothing is lost by sleeping. Drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() since handing a disabled ring to another thread is a supported scenario, not a bug state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99128 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate chunk length in the inqueue parser SCTP chunks always include a four-byte generic header, but sctp_inq_pop() currently accepts shorter declared lengths. A zero-length chunk leaves chunk_end at the current header. When ASCONF is covered by the association's SCTP-AUTH policy, sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() can continue before the state machine performs its normal chunk-length check. sctp_inq_pop() then returns the same malformed chunk repeatedly and the receive softirq can lock up. A remote SCTP peer can trigger this after establishing an association on a kernel built with CONFIG_IP_SCTP and configured with net.sctp.addip_enable=1 and net.sctp.auth_enable=1. The reproducer did not require application credentials, a shared SCTP AUTH key, or net.sctp.addip_noauth_enable=1. On commit f967455fb2a5 ("seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation"), one zero-length ASCONF caused repeated watchdog soft-lockup reports in a two-vCPU KVM guest. All 3 pre-trigger health probes succeeded, while 36 of 37 post-trigger probes failed. With this change, all 37 post-trigger probes succeeded and no equivalent soft-lockup signature appeared. Reject chunks shorter than the generic SCTP header at the shared inqueue parser boundary. Mark the packet for discard before either caller can continue processing it, while preserving the four-byte generic minimum. Declared-length 1 through 4 controls and kernel-generated ASCONF traffic remained healthy. The patched sctp_hello selftest passed for IPv4 and IPv6. The complete private reproducer and validation evidence are available directly to maintainers on request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99127 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: page_pool: keep frag_offset aligned for odd-sized requests page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() rounds the requested fragment size with size = ALIGN(size, dma_get_cache_alignment()); dma_get_cache_alignment() returns 1 unless the architecture defines ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN, which DMA-coherent architectures such as x86 do not. There the ALIGN() is a no-op and pool->frag_offset advances by the raw, unrounded size. A single caller asking for an odd size then leaves frag_offset misaligned for every fragment carved out of that page afterwards. The pool is shared, so the damage is not confined to the caller that caused it. The per-cpu system_page_pool used by generic XDP hits this. skb_pp_cow_data() allocates its fragments with the raw packet length: size = min_t(u32, len, PAGE_SIZE); truesize = size; page = page_pool_dev_alloc(pool, &page_off, &truesize); leaving frag_offset odd for whatever is carved out of that page next. Its own head allocation is already aligned -- SKB_HEAD_ALIGN(size) plus the XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM its callers pass -- so it is a later user of the shared pool that pays: page_pool_dev_alloc_va() returns a misaligned buffer, napi_build_skb() installs it as skb->head, and skb_shinfo(skb) == skb->head + skb->end is misaligned with it. skb_shinfo()->dataref is a 4-byte atomic_t at offset 0x20, so the atomic_inc() in __skb_clone() straddles a cache line. On x86 with split lock detection -- fatal for kernel split locks by default -- this panics the machine: Oops: Split lock detected RIP: 0010:skb_clone+0x154/0x1e0 Call Trace: <IRQ> raw_local_deliver+0x1ed/0x2c0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x54/0x1c0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x85/0x100 ip_local_deliver+0x67/0x100 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0 process_backlog+0x87/0x130 Reproduced by attaching any generic-mode XDP program to loopback and opening a RAW IPPROTO_UDP socket, which makes raw_local_deliver() clone every locally delivered UDP packet; ordinary DNS traffic then triggers it, roughly once per 2500 clones. Observed on 6.12.101 and 7.1.8. Tracing page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() over one such run shows the amplification -- two odd-sized requests, nine misaligned offsets: requested size & 7: 0: 17035 5: 1 7: 1 frag_offset & 7: 0: 17028 3: 1 4: 1 5: 1 6: 1 7: 5 and skb_pp_cow_data() returning heads that were aligned on entry: head 0xffff8f4c86aeac00 -> 0xffff8f4c53a9a9c4 (&7=4) head 0xffff8f4d6a8a42c0 -> 0xffff8f4c4f7b7a45 (&7=5) Round the fragment size up to at least the alignment struct skb_shared_info requires, so fragments are always suitably aligned for the objects callers build on them. Architectures needing a larger DMA alignment keep it. This also makes the remainder computed in page_pool_alloc_netmem(), *size = max_size - *offset; aligned, since max_size is a power of two -- which fixes the matching misalignment of skb->end. Verified with a controlled A/B under QEMU/KVM: same tree, same config, same compiler, same rootfs and identical traffic, differing only by this patch. A SEC("xdp.frags") XDP_PASS program on lo plus UDP datagrams larger than max_head_size drives skb_pp_cow_data()'s fragment loop, which passes raw packet lengths to the pool. Measured at the return of skb_pp_cow_data(): unpatched patched skb_pp_cow_data calls 40800 40800 misaligned skb->head 1120 0 dataref at line offset >60 80 0 The last row counts the accesses that actually fault: skb_shinfo()->dataref sits at head+end+0x20 and is a 4-byte atomic, so `lock incl` splits a 64-byte cache line only when that address lands at offset 61..63. All 80 occurrences were at offset 61; the panic reported above was at offset 62. Eliminating the misalignment removes every one of them. Same class of bug as commit 3bed3cc4156e ("net: Do not allocate page fragments t ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-99126 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/ctcm: Prevent XID null dereference The mpc_validate_xid() function sets grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 to 0x40 to signal XID validation error. If peer XID is NULL or r/w channel pairing mismatch happens, grp->saved_xid2 is never initialized. An attempt to set the flag in such case leads to NULL dereference. Fix this by using the always available priv->xid->xid2_flag2 instead of grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 for validation errors. | ||||