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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-71220 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/server: call ksmbd_session_rpc_close() on error path in create_smb2_pipe() When ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp() fails, we should call ksmbd_session_rpc_close(). | ||||
| CVE-2025-71184 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix NULL dereference on root when tracing inode eviction When evicting an inode the first thing we do is to setup tracing for it, which implies fetching the root's id. But in btrfs_evict_inode() the root might be NULL, as implied in the next check that we do in btrfs_evict_inode(). Hence, we either should set the ->root_objectid to 0 in case the root is NULL, or we move tracing setup after checking that the root is not NULL. Setting the rootid to 0 at least gives us the possibility to trace this call even in the case when the root is NULL, so that's the solution taken here. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in nft_chain_validate(): watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547] [..] RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables] [..] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables] [..] Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths (chain jumps). But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation. Consider: 1 input -> j2 -> j3 2 input -> j2 -> j3 3 input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3 Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3, because this was already checked during validation of the first rule. We need to validate it only for rule 3. This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump might now exceed the allowed stack size. We also need to update all reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth. Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from invalid base chains. For example, the masquerade expression can only be called from NAT postrouting base chains. Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type, hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different hook location. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71157 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: always drop device refcount in ib_del_sub_device_and_put() Since nldev_deldev() (introduced by commit 060c642b2ab8 ("RDMA/nldev: Add support to add/delete a sub IB device through netlink") grabs a reference using ib_device_get_by_index() before calling ib_del_sub_device_and_put(), we need to drop that reference before returning -EOPNOTSUPP error. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: restore destructor on submit failure handshake_req_submit() replaces sk->sk_destruct but never restores it when submission fails before the request is hashed. handshake_sk_destruct() then returns early and the original destructor never runs, leaking the socket. Restore sk_destruct on the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71142 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpuset: fix warning when disabling remote partition A warning was triggered as follows: WARNING: kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1651 at remote_partition_disable+0xf7/0x110 RIP: 0010:remote_partition_disable+0xf7/0x110 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001947d88 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000007fff RBX: ffff888103b6e000 RCX: 0000000000006f40 RDX: 0000000000006f00 RSI: ffffc90001947da8 RDI: ffff888103b6e000 RBP: ffff888103b6e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88810b2e2728 R12: ffffc90001947da8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90001947da8 R15: ffff8881081f1c00 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f55c8bbe0b2 CR3: 000000010b14c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> update_prstate+0x2d3/0x580 cpuset_partition_write+0x94/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x147/0x200 vfs_write+0x35d/0x500 ksys_write+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f55c8cd4887 Reproduction steps (on a 16-CPU machine): # cd /sys/fs/cgroup/ # mkdir A1 # echo +cpuset > A1/cgroup.subtree_control # echo "0-14" > A1/cpuset.cpus.exclusive # mkdir A1/A2 # echo "0-14" > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.exclusive # echo "root" > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.partition # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu15/online # echo member > A1/A2/cpuset.cpus.partition When CPU 15 is offlined, subpartitions_cpus gets cleared because no CPUs remain available for the top_cpuset, forcing partitions to share CPUs with the top_cpuset. In this scenario, disabling the remote partition triggers a warning stating that effective_xcpus is not a subset of subpartitions_cpus. Partitions should be invalidated in this case to inform users that the partition is now invalid(cpus are shared with top_cpuset). To fix this issue: 1. Only emit the warning only if subpartitions_cpus is not empty and the effective_xcpus is not a subset of subpartitions_cpus. 2. During the CPU hotplug process, invalidate partitions if subpartitions_cpus is empty. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71137 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: fix "UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds error" This patch ensures that the RX ring size (rx_pending) is not set below the permitted length. This avoids UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds errors when users passes small or zero ring sizes via ethtool -G. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: fix possible null-pointer dereferences in raid5_store_group_thread_cnt() The variable mddev->private is first assigned to conf and then checked: conf = mddev->private; if (!conf) ... If conf is NULL, then mddev->private is also NULL. In this case, null-pointer dereferences can occur when calling raid5_quiesce(): raid5_quiesce(mddev, true); raid5_quiesce(mddev, false); since mddev->private is assigned to conf again in raid5_quiesce(), and conf is dereferenced in several places, for example: conf->quiesce = 0; wake_up(&conf->wait_for_quiescent); To fix this issue, the function should unlock mddev and return before invoking raid5_quiesce() when conf is NULL, following the existing pattern in raid5_change_consistency_policy(). | ||||
| CVE-2025-71122 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd/selftest: Check for overflow in IOMMU_TEST_OP_ADD_RESERVED syzkaller found it could overflow math in the test infrastructure and cause a WARN_ON by corrupting the reserved interval tree. This only effects test kernels with CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST. Validate the user input length in the test ioctl. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71119 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/kexec: Enable SMT before waking offline CPUs If SMT is disabled or a partial SMT state is enabled, when a new kernel image is loaded for kexec, on reboot the following warning is observed: kexec: Waking offline cpu 228. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9062 at arch/powerpc/kexec/core_64.c:223 kexec_prepare_cpus+0x1b0/0x1bc [snip] NIP kexec_prepare_cpus+0x1b0/0x1bc LR kexec_prepare_cpus+0x1a0/0x1bc Call Trace: kexec_prepare_cpus+0x1a0/0x1bc (unreliable) default_machine_kexec+0x160/0x19c machine_kexec+0x80/0x88 kernel_kexec+0xd0/0x118 __do_sys_reboot+0x210/0x2c4 system_call_exception+0x124/0x320 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec This occurs as add_cpu() fails due to cpu_bootable() returning false for CPUs that fail the cpu_smt_thread_allowed() check or non primary threads if SMT is disabled. Fix the issue by enabling SMT and resetting the number of SMT threads to the number of threads per core, before attempting to wake up all present CPUs. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Remove queue freezing from several sysfs store callbacks Freezing the request queue from inside sysfs store callbacks may cause a deadlock in combination with the dm-multipath driver and the queue_if_no_path option. Additionally, freezing the request queue slows down system boot on systems where sysfs attributes are set synchronously. Fix this by removing the blk_mq_freeze_queue() / blk_mq_unfreeze_queue() calls from the store callbacks that do not strictly need these callbacks. Add the __data_racy annotation to request_queue.rq_timeout to suppress KCSAN data race reports about the rq_timeout reads. This patch may cause a small delay in applying the new settings. For all the attributes affected by this patch, I/O will complete correctly whether the old or the new value of the attribute is used. This patch affects the following sysfs attributes: * io_poll_delay * io_timeout * nomerges * read_ahead_kb * rq_affinity Here is an example of a deadlock triggered by running test srp/002 if this patch is not applied: task:multipathd Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x8c1/0x1bf0 schedule+0xdd/0x270 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30 __mutex_lock+0xb89/0x1650 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 dm_table_set_restrictions+0x823/0xdf0 __bind+0x166/0x590 dm_swap_table+0x2a7/0x490 do_resume+0x1b1/0x610 dev_suspend+0x55/0x1a0 ctl_ioctl+0x3a5/0x7e0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x12/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x1a0 x64_sys_call+0xe2b/0x17d0 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> task:(udev-worker) Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x8c1/0x1bf0 schedule+0xdd/0x270 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xf2/0x140 blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x23/0x30 queue_ra_store+0x14e/0x290 queue_attr_store+0x23e/0x2c0 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b2/0x630 vfs_write+0x4fd/0x1390 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x276/0x17d0 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> | ||||
| CVE-2025-71088 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fallback earlier on simult connection Syzkaller reports a simult-connect race leading to inconsistent fallback status: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 33 at net/mptcp/subflow.c:1515 subflow_data_ready+0x40b/0x7c0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1515 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 33 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:subflow_data_ready+0x40b/0x7c0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1515 Code: 89 ee e8 78 61 3c f6 40 84 ed 75 21 e8 8e 66 3c f6 44 89 fe bf 07 00 00 00 e8 c1 61 3c f6 41 83 ff 07 74 09 e8 76 66 3c f6 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 6d 66 3c f6 48 89 df e8 e5 ad ff ff 31 ff 89 c5 89 c6 RSP: 0018:ffffc900006cf338 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888031acd100 RCX: ffffffff8b7f2abf RDX: ffff88801e6ea440 RSI: ffffffff8b7f2aca RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000002c10 R12: ffff88802ba69900 R13: 1ffff920000d9e67 R14: ffff888046f81800 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d69bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560fc0ca1670 CR3: 0000000032c3a000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_data_queue+0x13b0/0x4f90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5197 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xfdf/0x4ec0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6922 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x492/0x1740 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1672 tcp_v6_rcv+0x2976/0x41e0 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1918 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x188/0x1520 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0x1e4/0x4b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] ip6_input+0x105/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 dst_input include/net/dst.h:471 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x264/0x650 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12d/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5979 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:6092 process_backlog+0x442/0x15e0 net/core/dev.c:6444 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 net/core/dev.c:7494 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7557 [inline] net_rx_action+0xa9f/0xfe0 net/core/dev.c:7684 handle_softirqs+0x216/0x8e0 kernel/softirq.c:579 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:968 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x3a/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:960 smpboot_thread_fn+0x3f7/0xae0 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x5d7/0x6f0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> The TCP subflow can process the simult-connect syn-ack packet after transitioning to TCP_FIN1 state, bypassing the MPTCP fallback check, as the sk_state_change() callback is not invoked for * -> FIN_WAIT1 transitions. That will move the msk socket to an inconsistent status and the next incoming data will hit the reported splat. Close the race moving the simult-fallback check at the earliest possible stage - that is at syn-ack generation time. About the fixes tags: [2] was supposed to also fix this issue introduced by [3]. [1] is required as a dependence: it was not explicitly marked as a fix, but it is one and it has already been backported before [3]. In other words, this commit should be backported up to [3], including [2] and [1] if that's not already there. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71076 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Limit num_syncs to prevent oversized allocations The OA open parameters did not validate num_syncs, allowing userspace to pass arbitrarily large values, potentially leading to excessive allocations. Add check to ensure that num_syncs does not exceed DRM_XE_MAX_SYNCS, returning -EINVAL when the limit is violated. v2: use XE_IOCTL_DBG() and drop duplicated check. (Ashutosh) (cherry picked from commit e057b2d2b8d815df3858a87dffafa2af37e5945b) | ||||
| CVE-2025-68223 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/radeon: delete radeon_fence_process in is_signaled, no deadlock Delete the attempt to progress the queue when checking if fence is signaled. This avoids deadlock. dma-fence_ops::signaled can be called with the fence lock in unknown state. For radeon, the fence lock is also the wait queue lock. This can cause a self deadlock when signaled() tries to make forward progress on the wait queue. But advancing the queue is unneeded because incorrectly returning false from signaled() is perfectly acceptable. (cherry picked from commit 527ba26e50ec2ca2be9c7c82f3ad42998a75d0db) | ||||
| CVE-2025-68214 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: timers: Fix NULL function pointer race in timer_shutdown_sync() There is a race condition between timer_shutdown_sync() and timer expiration that can lead to hitting a WARN_ON in expire_timers(). The issue occurs when timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function to NULL while the timer is still running on another CPU. The race scenario looks like this: CPU0 CPU1 <SOFTIRQ> lock_timer_base() expire_timers() base->running_timer = timer; unlock_timer_base() [call_timer_fn enter] mod_timer() ... timer_shutdown_sync() lock_timer_base() // For now, will not detach the timer but only clear its function to NULL if (base->running_timer != timer) ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); if (shutdown) timer->function = NULL; unlock_timer_base() [call_timer_fn exit] lock_timer_base() base->running_timer = NULL; unlock_timer_base() ... // Now timer is pending while its function set to NULL. // next timer trigger <SOFTIRQ> expire_timers() WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) // hit ... lock_timer_base() // Now timer will detach if (base->running_timer != timer) ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); if (shutdown) timer->function = NULL; unlock_timer_base() The problem is that timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function regardless of whether the timer is currently running. This can leave a pending timer with a NULL function pointer, which triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) check in expire_timers(). Fix this by only clearing the timer function when actually detaching the timer. If the timer is running, leave the function pointer intact, which is safe because the timer will be properly detached when it finishes running. | ||||
| CVE-2025-40325 | 1 Linux | 2 Kernel, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid10: wait barrier before returning discard request with REQ_NOWAIT raid10_handle_discard should wait barrier before returning a discard bio which has REQ_NOWAIT. And there is no need to print warning calltrace if a discard bio has REQ_NOWAIT flag. Quality engineer usually checks dmesg and reports error if dmesg has warning/error calltrace. | ||||
| CVE-2025-40134 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: fix NULL pointer dereference in __dm_suspend() There is a race condition between dm device suspend and table load that can lead to null pointer dereference. The issue occurs when suspend is invoked before table load completes: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000054 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 6798 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.6.0-g7e52f5f0ca9b #62 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:blk_mq_wait_quiesce_done+0x0/0x50 Call Trace: <TASK> blk_mq_quiesce_queue+0x2c/0x50 dm_stop_queue+0xd/0x20 __dm_suspend+0x130/0x330 dm_suspend+0x11a/0x180 dev_suspend+0x27e/0x560 ctl_ioctl+0x4cf/0x850 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xd/0x20 vfs_ioctl+0x1d/0x50 __se_sys_ioctl+0x9b/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2c4a/0x4620 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1b0 The issue can be triggered as below: T1 T2 dm_suspend table_load __dm_suspend dm_setup_md_queue dm_mq_init_request_queue blk_mq_init_allocated_queue => q->mq_ops = set->ops; (1) dm_stop_queue / dm_wait_for_completion => q->tag_set NULL pointer! (2) => q->tag_set = set; (3) Fix this by checking if a valid table (map) exists before performing request-based suspend and waiting for target I/O. When map is NULL, skip these table-dependent suspend steps. Even when map is NULL, no I/O can reach any target because there is no table loaded; I/O submitted in this state will fail early in the DM layer. Skipping the table-dependent suspend logic in this case is safe and avoids NULL pointer dereferences. | ||||
| CVE-2025-39989 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mce: use is_copy_from_user() to determine copy-from-user context Patch series "mm/hwpoison: Fix regressions in memory failure handling", v4. ## 1. What am I trying to do: This patchset resolves two critical regressions related to memory failure handling that have appeared in the upstream kernel since version 5.17, as compared to 5.10 LTS. - copyin case: poison found in user page while kernel copying from user space - instr case: poison found while instruction fetching in user space ## 2. What is the expected outcome and why - For copyin case: Kernel can recover from poison found where kernel is doing get_user() or copy_from_user() if those places get an error return and the kernel return -EFAULT to the process instead of crashing. More specifily, MCE handler checks the fixup handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be recovered. When EX_TYPE_UACCESS is found, the PC jumps to recovery code specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT() and return a -EFAULT to user space. - For instr case: If a poison found while instruction fetching in user space, full recovery is possible. User process takes #PF, Linux allocates a new page and fills by reading from storage. ## 3. What actually happens and why - For copyin case: kernel panic since v5.17 Commit 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and later patches updated the extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from EX_TYPE_UACCESS to EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG. It breaks previous EX_TYPE_UACCESS handling when posion found in get_user() or copy_from_user(). - For instr case: user process is killed by a SIGBUS signal due to #CMCI and #MCE race When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed. ### Background: why *UN*corrected errors tied to *C*MCI in Intel platform [1] Prior to Icelake memory controllers reported patrol scrub events that detected a previously unseen uncorrected error in memory by signaling a broadcast machine check with an SRAO (Software Recoverable Action Optional) signature in the machine check bank. This was overkill because it's not an urgent problem that no core is on the verge of consuming that bad data. It's also found that multi SRAO UCE may cause nested MCE interrupts and finally become an IERR. Hence, Intel downgrades the machine check bank signature of patrol scrub from SRAO to UCNA (Uncorrected, No Action required), and signal changed to #CMCI. Just to add to the confusion, Linux does take an action (in uc_decode_notifier()) to try to offline the page despite the UC*NA* signature name. ### Background: why #CMCI and #MCE race when poison is consuming in Intel platform [1] Having decided that CMCI/UCNA is the best action for patrol scrub errors, the memory controller uses it for reads too. But the memory controller is executing asynchronously from the core, and can't tell the difference between a "real" read and a speculative read. So it will do CMCI/UCNA if an error is found in any read. Thus: 1) Core is clever and thinks address A is needed soon, issues a speculative read. 2) Core finds it is going to use address A soon after sending the read request 3) The CMCI from the memory controller is in a race with MCE from the core that will soon try to retire the load from address A. Quite often (because speculation has got better) the CMCI from the memory controller is delivered before the core is committed to the instruction reading address A, so the interrupt is taken, and Linux offlines the page (marking it as poison). ## Why user process is killed for instr case Commit 046545a661af ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-39959 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: acp: Fix incorrect retrival of acp_chip_info Use dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent) instead of dev_get_platdata(dev) to correctly obtain acp_chip_info members in the acp I2S driver. Previously, some members were not updated properly due to incorrect data access, which could potentially lead to null pointer dereferences. This issue was missed in the earlier commit ("ASoC: amd: acp: Fix NULL pointer deref in acp_i2s_set_tdm_slot"), which only addressed set_tdm_slot(). This change ensures that all relevant functions correctly retrieve acp_chip_info, preventing further null pointer dereference issues. | ||||
| CVE-2025-39958 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-11-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat() fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the hypervisor is concerned. Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device() fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() because attaching to the default domain must never fail. With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up the device. This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the link. Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they apply to all PCI instructions. | ||||